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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 15, 1985 Conference
List 5, Sheet 1
No. 84-805-CFX
O'NEILL
(Trustee in Bankruptcy)

Cert to CA3
(Garth, Higginbotham:
G1bbons, diss)

v.
NEW YORK, et al.
(state environmental
authorities)
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

This case is curve-lined with Midlantic National Bank

v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 84-801.

Please

see the memorandum prepared for that petition.
I recommend denial.
There are two responses.
January 26, 1985
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 15, 1985 Conference
List 5, Sheet 1
No. 84-801-CFX
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK
(creditor with perfected
security interest)

Cert to CA3
(Garth, Higginbotham~
Gibbons, diss)

v.
NEW JERSEY DEP'T
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Federal/Civil

Timely

Federal/Civil

Timely

No. 84-805-CFX
O'NEILL
(Trustee in Bankruptcy)

v.
NEW YORK, et al.
(state environmental
authorities)
SUMMARY: Does 11

u.s.c.

§554(a) permit the Trustee to aban-

don property of the bankrupt estate when that abandonment may

'-

violate state environmental protection laws?

W

~

~. cA3'~ ~ 1 ~ ~b ~~. r ~~
. s
sl.rJJ wc:..J ~ oJh.; (A'J - ~ --~;Jtr- R.l ~.ttu.J~ ~.h~·

~f

)...ca_

- 2 -

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW:

These curve-lined cases arose out

of the bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp, which owned and operated waste oil storage and processing facilities in Long Island
City, NY, and Edgewater, NJ.
Petr, by virtue of a $600,000 loan to Quanta

No. 84-801:

for working capital, obtained a security interest in certain assets of Quanta.

Resp had authorized Quanta to operate its

Edgewater site on the condition that it not accept PCBcontaminated oil.

(PCB's are extremely hazardous chemicals.)

After resp discovered PCB-contaminated oil at the plant, Quanta
agreed to cease operations on July 2, 1981.

While resp and Quan-

ta were negotiating as to the latter's obligation to clean up the
contaminated oil, Quanta filed a petn for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on Oct 6, 1981.

A month later, this action was converted

to a Chapter 7 liquidation.

On Oct 7, resp had issued an admin-

istrative order requiring Quanta to clean up all hazardous materials.
O'Neill (petr in No. 84-805) , the Trustee in Bankruptcy for
Quanta, gave notice of proposed abandonment of the Edgewater facility under §554(a).

That section provides:

"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or
that is of inconsequential value to the estate."
The Trustee realized that the expected costs of cleanup would
exceed the minimal value of the facility.

Resp opposed the aban-

donment, contending that this would violate state law because
contaminated oil must be stored and disposed of in compliance
with state regulations.
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lie health and safety because the oil would be left at the facility.
After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Ct, on May 20, 1983, authorized the abandonment: the Trustee vacated the premises on July 1.
Thereafter, the par ies consented to resp's taking a direct appeal to the CA3.
Ro. 84-805:

Petr O'Neill, the Trustee, also filed a notice

of intention to abandon Quanta's Long Island City plant.

At the

time, the plant housed at least 70,000 gallons of contaminated
oil.

The Trustee determined that compliance with applicable NY

laws would have required substantial expenditures to guard, repair, and clean up the facility and to dipose of the waste.

Giv-

en the facility's low value, the Trustee decided that the requisite expenditures would render the property a burden on the estate.
Resp opposed the abandonment, claiming that abandonment
would, in effect, constitute disposal of the hazardous wastes in
violation of NY law, and would create a continuing violation of
state and local hazardous waste storage laws.

In addition, resp

argued that S959(b) prohibited abandonment under S554(a).

Sec-

tion 959(b) requires that a trustee
"manage and operate its property in his possession as such
trustee ••• according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which the property is situated, in the same
manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to
do if in possession thereof."
The Bankruptcy Ct issued an order, on July 7, 1982, permitting abandonment.

That court refused to stay the order pending

appeal, and refused to grant resp a first lien on the property to

- 4 -

the extent of any monies that resp might expend to bring the
abandoned property into compliance with state law.

Following the

abandonment, apparently resp did clean up the facility at a cost
of roughly $2.5 million.
The DC affirmed the Bankruptcy Ct's order.

(Resp did not

raise the question of its right to a first lien.)
Holding Below:

The CA3 considered both cases together and

held that §554(a) does not permit the Trustee to abandon property
when that abandonment may violate state environmental laws.

Ac-

cordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cases either to
the DC or the Bankruptcy Ct.

Initially, the court recognized

that the purposes of the bankruptcy law and state environmental
laws cannot be reconciled where the trustee legitimately invokes
his power to abandon an asset whose manner of abandonment the
state regulates.

The issue thus boiled down to whether Congress

intended the trustee's abandonment power to be unrestricted by
public health and safety regulations.
In concluding that Congress had no such sweeping intent to
displace state environmental laws under the circumstances, the
court pointed to pre-1978 Code practice.

These cases held that

the trustee's abandonment power was subject to the "application
of general regulations of a police nature."

The court also found

support for this conclusion in the automatic stay provision of
§362(a), which grants an exception "where a governmental unit is
suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of ••• environmental
protection ••• laws •••• "

739 F.2d, at 918.

Lastly, the court

cited §959(b), which contained the "implicit notion" that the
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goals of the bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, "do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business even if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted by applying
state laws."

Id., at 719.

The court made it clear that §959(b)

was not an independent prohibition of the trustee's abandoning
property in contravention of state

law~

rather, that section in-

dicated that Congress did not intend to subjugate state and local
regulatory laws.
The court thus stated that it must balance the relative
weight of the state and federal policies in determining whether
the trustee may abandon property in contravention of state law.
In the end, the court concluded that the states' interest in publie health outweighed the need to preserve as much of the estate
as possible for distribution to creditors.
"If trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose of
hazardous wastes under the cloak of the abandonment power,
compliance with environmental protection laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by default. It cannot be
said that the bankruptcy laws were intended to work such a
radical change in the nature of local public health and
safety regulation -- the substitution of governmental action
for citizen compliance -- without an indication that Congress so intended." 739 F.2d, at 922-923.
In a footnote, the court rejected the Trustee's claim that prohibiting abandonment may effect an unconstitutional taking, essentially concluding that the states' enforcement of their environmental laws must be characterized as permissible exercises of
regulatory power, rather than as takings.
Finally, the court noted that resp NY may be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate for its clean up costs as "adminis-

.
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trative expenses," §503(b) (1) (A).

The court declined, however,

to reach the issue of the priority, if any, of the state's claim.
Judge Gibbons dissented.

The language of §554(a) is clear:

the trustee may abandon the properties at issue.

The majority's

reliance on pre-1978 Code cases is off the mark because Congress
chose not to provide an express exception to the trustee's §554
abandonment power.

Judge Gibbons believed that the majority's

approach created a substantial issue under the Fifth

Amendment~

in this respect, the majority flouted United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 459

u.s.

70 (1982), which held that the Bank-

ruptcy Act should not be construed to destroy creditors' interests when a substantial question arises as to whether the Act
constitutes an unconstitutional taking.

Accordingly, §554 should

be construed consistent with its plain meaning to allow the
trustee to abandon the properties.
Judge Gibbons also criticized the majority for sidestepping
the difficult issues of whether the state's expenses may be recovered and whether the state has a priority over other creditors' claims.

The court has the responsibility to determine

whose pocket will supply the funds for compliance with state law.
CONTENTIONS :
Petr in Ro. 801:

Petr reiterates Judge Gibbon's argument that Security National Bank compels a reading of §554(a) to avoid an unconstitutional taking.

Section 554(a) should be interpreted according to

its language and so as not to extinguish creditors' perfected

.... ..-- ......
~

~

...

-

-~

-
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security interests under the guise of promoting state environmental laws.
Resp in Ro. 801:
Resp maintains that the CA3's holding, although one of first
impression under the 1978 Code, follows the pre-Code decisions
establishing that the trustee's abandonment power is limited by
the need to comply with state public health regulations.
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (CA4 1952).
not address this issue absent a conflict.

~.,

The Court need

Moreover, resp points

out that the CA3's decision has limited importance because it
merely concluded that the trustee must retain the property rather
than abandon it; the CA3 did not decide what, if any, funds of
the estate must be expended on compliance with state law.
Resp also disputes the relevance of Security National Bank.

~

Given the CA3's limited ruling, it is difficult to perceive any
potential unconstitutional taking at stake.
Petr in Ro. 805:
Petr, the Trustee, contends that the CA3's decision conflicts with the underlying rationale of NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 104

s.

Ct. 1188 (1984).

In that case, the Court re-

fused to engraft an exception to §365(a) for collective bargaining agreements, reasoning that Congress knew how to draft an exclusion when it wanted to.

Similarly, the language of §554(a)

admits of no exceptions for state environmental laws.
Petr echoes the Security Industrial Bank argument raised by
Judge Gibbons and the companion petition, and asks this Court to
grant cert in order to insure conformity with that decision.

- -'"'- -- ... --·:-:; ........

- 8 -

Petr takes a pot shot at the CA3's reliance on §959(b).
Citing Professor Moore's treatise, petr asserts that §959(b) applies only to an ongoing business and thus has no application to
the abandonments at issue.
Petr chides the CA3 for misstating the issue because the
record does not support the court's assumption that abandonment
would violate state law.

The critical issue is whether state

governments, acting pursuant to environmental laws, can restrict
a trustee's abandonment authority and require him to expend and
distribute the estate's assets in a manner not required by the
Code.

Section 554(a) vests in the trustee the broad authority to

unload burdensome assets.

When the trustee abandons property,

the property reverts back to the debtor; the trustee (assuming,
as is the case here, he does not "operate" the property) stands
as if he never had an interest in the property.

Under the cir-

cumstances, the trustee cannot be denied the statutory right to
abandon the estate's assets.
Finally, petr points out that the CA3's decision will throw
an unnecessary wrench into the Code's application.

Congress spe-

cifically declined to grant governmental entities a priority over
other creditors for "administrative expenses."

Similarly, §510

does not provide the statutory basis for subordination of administrative, secured, or other unsecured claims to the claims of NY
and NJ.

Petr also suggests that the CA3's decision will deter

persons from serving as Trustees in Bankruptcy.
Resp RY in Ro. 84-805:

. .,..
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Resp asserts that the CA3 correctly determined that Congress
did not intend the trustee's abandonment power to be unrestricted
by state public health law.

Bildisco is not controlling because

the statute at issue in that case, §365(a), contained a number of
limitations, whereas §554(a) contains none.
reasoning behind this argument.
evant.)

(I cannot fathom the

Fortunately, it is not that rel-

The CA3's application of §554 does not create any uncon-

stitutional taking given the indirect exercise of state regulatory power.

Accordingly, petr's reliance on Security Industrial

Bank is beside the point.

Finally, resp points out that the CA3

did not address the precise questions that trouble petr -- the
availability of reimbursement from the estate and the priority of
the states' claims.

Thus, the Court need not review this case in

order to decide whether the CA3's decision will frustrate the
objectives of the Code.
Resp NJ in Ro. 84-805:

Resp merely reiterates the arguments raised before.

Resp

does discuss the Court's recent decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, No.
83-1020 (Jan 9, 1985), and states that the CA3's holding does not
conflict with it.

Kovacs specifically left open the question at

issue in these cases.
DISCUSSION:

See slip op. at 10, n. 12.

Resp NJ is correct that Kovacs left for another

day the difficult issue decided by the CA3.
CA3's holding makes a good deal of sense.

On the one hand, the
The estate (and pre-

sumably the creditors) should bear the burden of complying with
applicable state environmental laws.

Moreover, it is not far-

fetched to assume that Congress never intended S554(a) to permit

- ..

.

~

..

~

·-

-.. ,.,. ...

-.

~.

..

.

- 10 -

trustees to shift the burden of paying state-imposed cleanup
costs to the state.

On the other hand, the "plain meaning" of

§554(a), in light of the pre-1978 Code practice recognizing the
constraint, 1 and decisions such as Bildisco, indicate that perhaps the provision does grant a trustee a broad and unfettered
abandonment power.

As Judge Gibbons' dissent noted, "trustees

are appointed not for the benefit of the world at large, but
solely for the purpose of liquidating property for the benefit of
creditors."

739 F.2d, at 923.

The Security Industrial Bank issue seems to be a smokescreen
for the central question in the case -- the interpretation of
§554(a).

Moreover, the complicated statutory questions about the

state's ability to recover expenses and the state's priority over
other creditors were not resolved by the CA3 and are not properly
subject to review at this time.
The CA3's §554(a) holding seems to be a case of first impression.

I do not think the Court needs to review the case at

this time given the unknown importance of the ruling.

The CA3's

holding preserves the states' authority to enforce their environmental laws, certainly a vital interest, although this may be at
the expense of certain surprised and annoyed creditors.

Unless

the Court views the CA3's treatment of the issue as flatly incor-

1Assuming Congress was aware of the case law, one school
of thought might presume that Congress rejected those decisions
by not having any qualifying language in §554(a). Of course, the
contrary argument would be that Congress merely intended to
codify the status quo and saw no need to spell out the existing
practice that all followed •
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rect, the Court might be better served by having other courts
explore the matter before ultimately resolving it.
I recommend denial.
There is a response in No. 84-801: there are two responses
in No. 84-805.
January 26, 1985
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From:

s~f/1

Augus ~ 8, 1985

Mr. Justice Powell

7-i .

Cabell
No. 84-801 & 84-805, Midlantic National Bank
Jersey Department of Environment Protection

v.

New

Question Presented
To what extent must a trustee in bankruptcy comply with
environmental laws in abandoning property under 11

1.

u.s.c.

§

554?

Background
The

file

memo

from Mr.

Justice

case contains all of the material facts.

Powell

regarding

this

Go

II.

Discussion
The

judgment of

the

Court

of

Appeals

prohibiting

the

trustee from abandoning property in contravention of police regu-

-

latory powers should be affirmed.
courts consistently
ment

rule

as

interpreted

yieldin~

the

Before the 1978 codification,
the

judicially-created abandon-

states'

p~ lice

powers,

and

this

Court should similarly deem section 554 to encompass this qualification.

Congress

did

not

inten d. for

the

bankruptcy code

to

~e- ~~~~ state environmental laws: Other provisions of the bank-

ruptcy code are subject to a similar exception for states' police
powers,

and

recognizing

that qualification

for

the

abandonment

power would be consistent with these interpretations.
strong

reasons

of

public

policy

support

a

Finally,

restriction on

the

trustee's powers to abandon property in violation of laws safeguarding public health and safety.
A.

Congress incorporated within section 554 the judiciallyrecognized limitations that subject the trustee's abandonment authority to general police powers.
The judicial history of the ~ andonment power shows that
A,

a trustee must abide by generally applicable state law safeguarding public health and safety.

This reliance is properly placed.

There is universal agreement that section 554 is a codification
of the judicially developed rule of abandonment.

The SG asserts

that prior to codification, this power to abandon was subject to
the application of general regulations of a police nature.
statement is correct.

This

See Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289

(CA4 1952); 4A Collier on Bankruptcy 11 70.42[21

(14th ed. 1978).

The general rule is that when Congress intends for a codification

.j.

to make an important change in the
ated concept, it says so.
acting

the

Congress

adopted

trustee's

the

abandonment

of a judicially cre-

The SG therefore contends that in en-

codification of

1978

ope~ation

this

recognized
power

by

judicially created

judicial
its

limitations

silence

Judged by any measure of Congressional

intent,

in

this

rule,

on

the

matter.

it appears

that

Congress did not intend for the public interest exception to the
abandonment power to be overruled by the codification of section
554.
[Nor can a

single

footnote

in Ohio v.

Kovacs,

No.

83-

------~

1020, at 10 n.l2, be taken as support for petrs position.
footnote

says,

in

pertinent part,

less than the cost of cleanup,

"If

the

That

property were worth

the trustee would likely abandon

it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state
environmental law to the extent of his or its ability."
present case,

In the

the trustee removed the guards and fire-prevention

equipment from the Long Island site.

This abandonment goes be-

yond

title to the property in

the

"legal fiction"

the debtor.

of

revesting

Kovacs said nothing to cast doubt on the continuing

vitality of the public interest exception to the abandonment power.]
Midlantic suggests that Ottenheimer would have been decided differently if if section 554 had then been in existence.
Congress, however, must be presumed to have codified not only the
judicially-developed

rule

of

abandonment,

but

also

the

well-

established corollary that the trustee must exercise his abandonment power

in conformity with

federal and state police powers.

4.

There is thus no merit to the contention that Ottenheimer would
be decided differently post-1978.
B.

There is no federal preemption problem in recognizing a
trustee's obligation to obey state environmental regulation: Other sections of the Bankruptcy Code meant to
maximize the debtor's estate are subject to state and
federal police power regulations for health and safety
and because Congress has repeatedly expressed a special
interest in environmental regulation to be undertaken
co-extensively with the state.
The

bankruptcy code

distribution

of

the

was

debtor's

enacted

assets

by

to provide an
avoiding

the

order~

arbitrary

payoffs of creditors that would result from a race to the courthouse and by maximizing the value of the debtor's estate by allowing
that

for

the

coordinated

sale

of

various

Petr s

assets.

contend

bankruptcy law trumps state environmental legislations

and that the trustee's power to abandon property is absolute if
the property is found to be burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.

O~er
strate that

ban~ptc~de,

sections of _: he

the Bankruptcy Act,

legitimate use of

---------------~

stat~ce

however,

taken as a whole,

~n- ~~

supports the

power for public health and safety

----~--------~---------------------------~~

even when this might have some effect on the bankruptcy process.
See 11

u.s.c.

§

362 (exemption from the automatic stay provision

for regulatory actions); 28
law).

u.s.c.

Under section 362 (b) (4),

§ 959

(trustee must obey state

the stay under section 362 (a) (1)

does not apply to the commencement or continuation of an action
or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce the governmental
unit's police or regulatory power -- when that power is for the
public's health or
proval

in

the

House

safety.

In two cases mentioned with disap-

report on

the

section,

the

stay prevented

(J,t.<...~

5.

Maine from closing down a debtor's ind4strial plant that was polluting a river

in violation of state environmental regulations,

and prevented Nevada from obtaining an injunction against an individual who was violating state consumer protection laws.

H.R.

Rep. 95-595, at 174-175.
Courts
Coal Corp.,

have

5 B.R.

followed
571

this

M.D.Pa.

interpretation.

In

re

Blue

1979), held that an attempt to

substitute the bankruptcy trustee for the debtor in a state court
contempt proceeding for failure to comply with a negotiated settlement of an order to backfill and maintain equipment at a strip
mine

prior

stay.

In

y{. D. N.y.

to bankruptcy
re

Zeitzer

1976),

was

not

Food Corp.,

applied

a

violation of

Bankr.

L.Rep.

the automatic
(CCH)

11

66,051

the automatic stay to an attempt by a

New York agency to revoke the food purveying license of the debtor.

The court reasoned that the purpose of the license was to

protect against fraud, rather than to maintain the purity of the
foods
292

distributed.

( ~D.N.Y.

efforts

to

In

1978),

revoke

the

re

Parkchester General Hospital,

stayed

for

hospital

forty-five
license of

days
the

4 B. R.

administrative

debtor

based on

concern for adequate physician supervision.
It

seems

especially

important

that

the

enforcement of

4-tl.dl-~~ ... .oc.A ~ ~ L~

health and safety regulations should ~ the bankruptcy code· in
"'\

light of Congress' heavy involvement in the regulation of hazardous wastes.

State environmental regulations have

been undertaken under

the

auspices of various

and compliment or complete federal schemes.
rect

to characterize

the

in large part

federal

statutes

Thus, petr is incor-

tension between the bankruptcy provi-

· ~~

6.

sions

and

federal

local

and

environmental

state

provisions.

courts are entitled

to

take

regulat;ions
To

the

and

extent

a

clash

that

between

bankruptcy

into account federal environmental

concerns in forbidding abandonment of waste sites, see In re T.P.
Long Chemical,

Inc.,

45 B.R. 278, 284-286

(Br.N.D.Ohio 1985), it

would not interfere with a federal purpose to take into account
identical

concerns

based

demonstrate a clear

on

state

law.

Finally,

c.

u.s.c.

§§

has

intent that private parties bear as much of

the cost of toxic waste cleanup as possible.
42

Congress

See, e.g., CERCLA,

9601 et seq.

Considerations of ' bublic policy t'support subjecting the
trustee's abandonment power to applicable police regulations to protect the public health and safety.
There are sound reasons for imposing the costs of clean-

up upon Quanta's creditors rather

than on the public at large.

First, as discussed above, Congress wishes to impose liability on
private parties to clean up the wastes for which they are in some
way responsible.

The creditors, unlike the

genera ~

public ~ ve

~

assumed the risk that their economic fortunes would be adversely ~
affected by Quanta's violations of environmental statutes.

Sec-

ond, allowing abandonment here would allow the owners and creditors of firms

in toxic-waste industries to slough off their li-

abilities while retaining their assets.

As soon as liability for

cleanup

for

attached,

the

firm

could

file

bankruptcy,

abandon

those properties for which cleanup was required, and distribute
the still-valuable properties among the creditors.

To hold oth-

erwise would convert the trustee's abandonment power into a vehicle for transferring the cost of cleanup to the public at large.

7.

Finally,

petrs'

argument of absolute abandonment power

would lead to absurd results.

If the trustee were able to exer-

cise such power, he could abandon en route a truckload of toxic
wastes on the side of

the

If the trustee acknowl-

interstate.

q

edges that such an abandonment power is too broad -- as he must -

the question then simply becomes one of the reasonableness of

particular

limits

on

the

abandonment

power,

and

not

a

simple

question of statutory construction.
D.

The takings clause argument lacks merit.
Petrs had an economic interest in Quanta's profitability

before

Quanta's

insolvency,

yet

they would

have

had

no

taking

clause claim based on the assertion that compliance with environmental regulations would decrease Quanta's profitability and thus
its ability to pay back their investment.
gated to obey the same laws,
compliance will

similarly

If the estate is obli-

I cannot see why the fact that this

reduce

their

ability to recoup their

investment is transformed into a violation of the takings clause.
Second, as creditors of Quanta, petrs assumed the risk that compliance with state law -- whether prior to or during bankruptcy -

~

- would diminish the return on their investment.

E.

U---

The implications of affirming the Third Circuit's judgment:
Who bears the costs of maintaining the site, and '--1-'--~f
L
for how long, and who is responsible for the ultimate
clean-up, and with what status as a creditor?
~~If the trustee is not entitled to abandon the site, he

must continue

to manage

it.

The costs of such management,

in-

eluding the provision of guards and the maintenance of the fire
system, become administrative expenses entitled to first priority
under section 506.

The difficult question is what happens after

~

a--~

ln...-

8.

~!;>

~
that.

)

1 do not believe that the estate should be kept open as

~

long as the assets hold out while the trustee maintains the waste
site.

Once the trustee has marshalled all of the estate's assets

and has determined
.

Q
,..,...

the creditors'

~ dissolved
____..

and

the estate should be

the sites revert to the debtor and ultimately to

~~ states for cleanup.
~

claims,

?

The state would, upon dissolution of the

estate, join the unsecured creditors for a share of the remaining
assets,

unless

state

law gave

the

state

a

statutorily created

lein against the estate.
A question also arises over the specific contours of the restrictions on the trustee's abandonment power.

1

believe that an injunction against any abandonment uin violation
of generally applicable police power regulationsfl
cise.
for

1 would

----------

recommend

the automatic stay.

following

the

-

is too impre-

limitations established

Under that approach,

------------

the state may en-

~

force against the debtor any action to protect the public health
and safety, but not one to protect the public fisc or to enforce
ugeneral

welfare u

hazardous

waste

regulations.
site,

A trustee

but could

abandon

could
a

not

logging

abandon

tract

------------

a

after

cutting the timber but before replanting, covering skid trails,
or other restorative measures.

If this Court were to hold other-

wise -- one example would be to hold all forms of environmental
regulation as excepted from the abandonment power -- the exception would go beyond

the

the

interpretations

pre-codification

traditional police power exception in
of

the

abandonment

power,

would be out of step with the narrow construction of the exception in

sec~n

364(b)

to the automatic stay, and would threaten

r

9.

to disrupt bankruptcy proceedings beyond the warrant of the publie's interest in "general welfare" regulations.
III. Conclusion
Legislative history, congressional involvement with hazardous wastes, and considerations of public policy support a restriction on the trustee's abandonment power.

The trustee should

be foreclosed from abandoning property when it is in contravention of police power regulations for health and safety.

]

Crystal
cvh
July 26, 1985
~-801

- MidAtlantic National Bank
v. N.J. Dept. of Environmental
Protection

84-805 - O'Neill, Trustee and Bankruptcy
of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor
Petitioner-- v. City of N.Y., et
al.
MEMORANDUM TO FILE
This memo is dictated on the basis of a preliminary
reading

of

the

opinions

of

CA3

and

the

DC,

and

particularly the brief amicus of the SG.

oil

Quanta Resources Corp.

(Quanta)

recovery

located,

Edgewater,

facilities

New

Jersey:

Syracuse, New York.
issue

before

us,

Long

Island

operates three wasre
respectively,
City,

New York:

in
and

Although perhaps not relevant to the
when

Quanta

acquired

the

Long

Island

2.

facility

(subject to two mortgages)

it also became subject

to a consent order by the New York Dept. of Environmental
Conservation
into

compliance

summary,
New

that

required
with

Quanta

state

to bring

the

environmental

facility

laws.

In

it appears that Quanta's operations of both its

Jersey

resulted

and
in

New

the

York

waste

violation

oil

of

nuisance laws of the two states.

recovery

the

facilities

environmental

and

Concentrations of PCB --

an extremely toxic carcinogen -- were found to exist, and
Quanta

discontinued

engaged

Edgewater

Operations

and

in negotiations concerning

cleanup of

its other

properties.

its

Quanta,

reorganization

however,

under

Chapter

filed

11

of

a

the

also

petition

for

Bankruptcy

Code

(the Code), and Thomas J. O'Neill was appointed trustee to
the

liquidate
relevant,

PCB

properties.
contamination

Although
at

the

not
Long

necessarily
Island

site

apparently was not discovered until after Quanta went into
bankruptcy.
Section

554 (a)

of

-----....,

relevant part:

the

Bankruptcy

Code

provides

in

3.

"After notice and an hearing, the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome
to
the
estate
or
that
is
of
inconsequential value to the estate."
Acting

under

creditors of his

Section

554

the

intention to abandon

trustee

notified

(I believe)

all of

---~

the contaminating sites, and the Bankruptcy Court approved
the

abandonment despite objections

from

state

and

local

authorities that this action would threaten public health
and

safety.

The

DC approved of

the abandonment orders,

y-'1

but CA3 -- with Judge Gibbons dissenting -- reversed both
of the DC's decisions.

Perhaps I should say here that one

~ons

related to the New Jersey properties

of

and the other to those in New York, but the same issue is
presented.
In perhaps

over-simplified

language,

the

SG

states

the question presented as follows:
"Whether a bankruptcy trustee's power to abandon
property that is a financial burden to the
bankruptcy
estate
is
subiect
to
generally
applicable law safeguarding?'puolic he ~and
saf ~·
..--_

' .

4.

The

SG argues

given by CA3

strongly

is correct,

that

and

the

that

affirmative answer

the

court should be affirmed -- though

judgment of that

in some respect upon

different reasoning.
In view of the importance of the case, I would like a
bench

memo

from

my

language of §554(a),
the

SG.

But

I

careful study,
reasoning.

clerk.

Despite

unequivocal

I am inclined to agree with CA3 and

want my

clerk,

on

the

to give me his or her
If,

the

however,

the

basis

of

a

more

recommendation and

clerk

should

agree

essentially with the reasoning of the SG, the bench memo
can be quite a brief one.

I

add

argument.
case

as

a

few

comments

a

"choice
an

while

respondents

must

primarily

assume

between

absolute

total

right

extremes"
to

the

abandon

initially argued

responsibility

the dangerous conditions.

·

the

SG's

for

trustee

hazardous
that

the

waste

trustee

the cleaning up of

The SG makes sense in answering

·,_

...

on

Although the briefs of the parties present the

demanding
the

based

5.

that th's degree of nabsolutism is neither necessary nor
desirablen.

The trustee's authority

to abandon property

powers construed reasonably to
accommodate
interest.

both

the

Bankruptcy

Code

and

public

health

The question may be viewed as one governed by

established principles of preemption under which federal
law (even in absolute terms) accommodates state law to the
extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the
purposes

of

Also,

Congress.

§959(b)

of

the

Bankruptcy

Code requires the trustee to nmanage and operaten property
in his possession in accordance with state law.
The
nwhether

the

§554

Bankruptcy

abandonment]

~

nissue

SG describes

preempting

of

the

creates
generally

before

Courtn

state

as

authorities

establish

to

applicable

public health and safety.

[that

Code

an

this

law

by

...---

safeguarding

law

In answering this question in

the negative, the SG -- relying on legislative history
says that §554 is a codification of a judge-made rule in
receivership

proceedings

that

recognizes

power to abandon burdensome property •

a

receiver's

Courts prior to the

6.

enactment

of

abandonment
police

§554

had

authority

powers

of

application of

a

recognized

was

the

subject,

the

however,

The

states.

tradi tiona!

that

SG

trustee's
to

also

general

finds

nuisance principles

to

the
the

facts of this case to be supported by a state law.
Finally,

__

claim

that

the

the

SG

responds

application

unconstitutional
taking
...........____---...___,..

of

briefly

of

state

creditors'

to
law

petitioner's
threatens

property

an

rights.

CA3 did not decide this question, and it may not be before
us.

I rather doubt that the question is a substantial one

where

in

fact

abandonment of

property hazardous

public would violate the police powers of a state.
L.F.P.

',.

..

to

the

\

84-80 ~

~/" ~q_y~s

~~

MIDLANTIC BANK V. NEW JERSEY

Argued 10/16/85

'/)4.~ (f.4v ""'-- '6 'f _'/, D S)

'

/L~ ~ ~ ~~- ;.,....pf ~ r~.

dj)4..r ~/ 1-J.-lL- ~ ~ ~h.v ~
~~~~
~~~~2-L-~/~~~

~~
+~~~~ .
~~~~~~
~~ ~~~~~(...../£

JJ-7~ ~~· ~.-(nt•e~ ~

u..- J-o ~I
J9 /{ w ~ '-/; 6c: ~~- ~~,)

J..p ~J-A::t..e; ~ ~

~ ~ -4/'. ~

(.,I--

L.~-t!!. ~~ ~ '-"'--

.
~~~ ~· ~~-u.jt-J~~~~~-4

~~~~~..........,.___

~~~k.

s{/~~~~ ~o-r~.
T~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~
~--~ __.L;;{ G~~ ~ ,-.;<~« f- /-o ~ ~ ~
I

~

-l~(f-vP-elv~ rV-<'tJ;)_[~ ~~
I'

T&' •* & .

~fs '-7 -L--1~4 ,:f</OODt!o,
~--~~h~~~. ~
~pJa.LL~.
~Akt~~~
)h-rf. ~ '7-t. 9·
~ tJL.. ~· ~Me;

)

~ ~- ~ ~ Sk::tl~
~5~~~~~;;~

4 ~- e::~-~ ~ ~ s~

....

•

•

~

·.

"'

...

..

.._

.
~

f"

''
,..

•••

'

'.

T~c~1)
~~ ~~--~~~~'-'
~ ~ pc... ~f-~/.u0o4;, ~
..--.&t.f~~~ ~~;:.__, ~ JSk--t-

1-v

~
T~'i-~~~~~

~ .

/Z-(, ~dt..~P.

~~:Jt~J~~~~~
Q~. 12-~b~
;;.

1-o~~~~~~.
"" 4••'-

~~j~~/\~<:::/1q.,.c·n1 ~-~

j_~~r-~~~~

?~). ~-~

(ys ow 6A¢e•

f

CLJ~., ~v.?fcM~~~

A-~~ r~~

)~~~~~

~ ~ ~ ~/i;:.'-l--~~11
~/Jd--~~ ~~1

~~(S.G. &jU·'/)(gl.f -8'"5)

~~~~~~~'~ ~~

Cu>A-~ ~ ~ ~ d~-y ~~~~~~j

•

WJI-t-A~~S~f~~
~~~~C/.._11~.) .

vt-

)~~~~~~~~
~ ~ c; ~~(<:)&/~.

?tr •~~ £':it-- ru.~~

a-/-~.r-1--'2~. ~."~~~~
~~. ·~'!~~

S:tJc

~~~~~~1/:)~~

.

\

....

·.
...

'.

. ..

·

.

~

~~~(~)
~ ~ <. sz.,. ~~~~~
wl·
~. ~c~-sJ-4A...~~

~~~~Et-~t~5~
~~~~~~kJ.

~ ~f1· . ~~~~-~~~4-~
d-4l/t-f~~ /~~~~~~(~5'

?

~~~)~~~~
~~s~~~~~.~
~~-

~. ;~(~.sa-pu~J
~~~~~~~/~·
~~.

1-f/( ~ ~

h

S()

tc ;t..;.A ~

7 ~~~~-~
~~------

0-v-~ ~~ J-o ~~ ~

~ ~~~ /'Z-I~J

rtu_~~~~~

~~/~~~~
~~~~.
S o--tz._ ~ ~-hz c/l- --s ~

---

~t;;;' tPj ~~~-It;;~
~/£. '-~ ~· <::/<9:, ~~

~/-c)~~~~
----.

''

'

'

.

~-9~{~)
~/.-.-,_. ~ ~ ~' ~ ~
~ ~ ~.s~ht-t,~ ~
lA
~

~~ - ~
~~~

c-1-. ~~~~,

!Jpt~~ ·

'·

·..

~ ~

•

o

'

~-

I

'I•

...

'

<'

.

'

1 /. p~~ :;L$4~l ~

~

j ~k4~,~~
~

1..

~

5 !""S"'/-

( ~)L~·:_,

~~)~~~ "~
-r-L~ ~ ~~~ ~
~~~.ur.

\

~

. ~

'

.

#-)"fS~~~

73~Cf. ~ln'(-1~

·i 13. '?~ 2......k..4-1-~

~\ -ht~~·~
A
~~
~ J..-t....c_ s~
.
~4v-r~~

Lf. ~~~ ?t.. ~_.:-~~ ~.o.o.,.az>u

- ~ rv¥""'~"&4 JPt~.

<

•

-

~ ,e a

J1 «e. _le

4~

. /a !ell!?

/~~~Uu...,~

r

4•· ceriiJA~;.··~·, '* z.. ~-~t: """*dA,, .. -'~

~kd;..~
v~~~~

J.0q,~6-f ~

.·
84-801
No. _
_ __

Conf. 10/18/85

The Chief Justice /~

PL~~o-t~~~~
~~~ C.4~~~~~~~-~~

~ CL:-1-.

Sl-~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

Tke_~~~~-J..o ~~~~~
~~~-

Justice Brennan ~ .>1-vV

~

r

6?

~ ~ ~~ ~~ aA~~~--Il!!t-
~ ~~.
h/-e- ~r ~ ~1-d ~
~ ~u.L~~~-h~-~p-y-

1-& 1-d- P

A

4£)?·;~~~ ~ ~

W4~~~~~~
~h~~~:-s~

~~.a-~v-r_ ~~-~~

.::f-.~

~J

Justice Marshall

Justice Blackmun ~ ~

f

i

...

Justice Rehnquist ~.

T~~~~~~J!o

.1h Qs o-f~

Justice Stevens ~
~~-

.

~~

Yf-

~ ~~ {~,.,~·~~~)~

~~-~~~~-~~
~4 ~~~ t-o~a

~~~G-~~~~

~

Justice O'Connor

a~~ t/J/Pw

.,-;s,

~~ r~~ ~1- ~~

~ P-/ ~C:.~ ~ ~~
~~ti-l!/~~~~~~
~·

.
,

-

'
'

'

'
'·

l•

CHAMIIE"S 0,-

..JUSTICE

w... ..J.

BRENNAN, ..JR.

October 21, 1985

No. 84-801)
)
)

)

Midatlantic Bank
v. N.J. DeEt•
Environmental
Protection

)

)

No. 84-805)

O'Neill v. City
of New York

Dear Thurgood, Harry and Lewis:
We
above.

four

are

in

dissent

in

the

Would you be willing, Lewis, to

take it on?
Sincerely,

~
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
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Dear Bill:
Although my vote to affirm was quite tentative, and
find the case troubling, I will be glad to try my hand at
a dissent.
I

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 84-801 AND 84-805
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER
u
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION

M-~1

THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION, DEBTOR,
PETITIONER
v.
M-805
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[November-, 1985]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two petitions for certiorari, which arise out of the
same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether a
bankruptcy court may condition a trustee's abandonment of
property upon compliance with state and local environmental
laws. We decide that the trustee's authority to "abandon
any property that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value to the estate," 11 U. S. C. § 554(a), is
not subject to any general requirement of compliance with
state regulatory laws.
In October 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following
month the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in
No. M-805, was thereupon appointed trustee in bankruptcy.
At the time it filed the bankruptcy petition, Quanta was in

-----------

84-801 &
2
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the business of storing and processing waste oils, and it is the
operation of its facilities in Long Island City, New York, and
Edgewater, New Jersey that .,.e at the center of this /
IS
dispute.
At the New York site, Quanta owned the real property
(subject to two mortgages totaling some $454,000), the facility, and its inventory. That inventory included approximately 500,000 gallons of waste oil, some 70,000 of which
were contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
The trustee, upon his appointment, obtained an appraisal of
this property and concluded that it was of no value to the estate. Mortgages exceeded the "forced sale" value, and the
estimated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil properly plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
Mter trying without success to sell the site for the benefit of
Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the
Bankruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pursuant to § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code. No one disputed the
trustee's claim that the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public
health and safety, and that the act of abandonment itself
would violate state and federal environmental law. New
York rested its objection on both "public policy considerations" reflected in applicable local laws and the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), which provides that a trustee
must "manage and operate" the property of the estate "according to the valid laws of the State in which the property is
situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order
that the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into
compliance with applicable law. Mter briefing and argument, the Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment,
noting that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in
every respect than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to

t

84-801 & 84-805---0PINION
MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

3

do what needs to be done to protect the public against the
dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility."
At the Edgewater, New Jersey site, Quanta leased the underlying real property and owned outright the facility and its
inventory. Quanta processed waste oil at Edgewater pursuant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New J ersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in No. 84-801. On June 3, 1981, Midlantic
National Bank (Midlantic), petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 working capital loan secured by
Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable and certain of its
equipment. Later that month, NJDEP found approximately
400,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil at the Edgewater
site. The presence of PCBs violated Quanta's operating permit, and on July 2, 1981, Quanta agreed to cease operations
at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta undertook negotiations
concerning cleanup of the property but the petition in bankruptcy, filed on October 6, 1981, intervened. The next day,
NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to
I
clean up the site.
In April 1983, shortly after the bankruptcy court had apI) . C . U .
proved abandonment of the New rork site, the~rustee gave
notice of his intent to abandon personal property at the
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment the
following month, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste.
The United States District Court for the District of New
\
Jersey affinned the ~ankruptcy ~ourt's determination with \ V- . L . \A
respect to the New York site, and New York appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. By the time the
Bankruptcy Court approved abandonment of the New Jersey
property, the identical issue was already presented in New
York's appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the parties there-

I

e__ ,

• l_

.
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fore consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B).
Following the abandonment of the New York site, New
York cleaned up that facility, with the exception of the contaminated subsoil, at an estimated cost of approximately
$2,500,000.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court decisions to permit abandonment. In re Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta I), 739 F. 2d 912 (New York case); In
re Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta II), 739 F. 2d 927 (New
Jersey case). While finding the legislative history of § 554
unhelpful, the Court presumed that Congress had intended to
codify the judge-made abandonment practice developed
under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Prior law, the Court
believed, held that where important state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest, that interest
should not be overridden by the judge-made abandonment
power unless accommodation of state interests is inconsistent
with explicit congressional intent. The Court found no such
intent in § 554. Instead, citing the exception to the automatic stay for the enforcement of police and regulatory
power, 11 U. S. C. §362(b)(4), (5), the requirement in 28
U. S. C. § 959(b) that trustees manage the property of the estate in compliance with state law, and the "equitable principles" that govern bankruptcy, the Court decided that Congress had not intended to preempt all state regulation, only
that grounded in policies outweighed by the relevant federal
interest. The Court thought that the policy advanced by
state environmental laws-protection of the public health by
regulating the disposal of toxic wastes-outweighed the federal interest in preserving the debtor's estate for distribution
to creditors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the Bankruptcy Court had erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases for further proceedings.
The dissenting judge argued that § 554 clearly permits
abandonment without any exception analogous to that pro-
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vided to the automatic stay. The dissent further contended
that the majority's interpretation of § 554 raised substantial
questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying
the interests of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of
the priority of the States' claims for reimbursement.
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly limited the
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property, - U. S. - - (1985), and now reverse.
As posed by the Court of Appeals, the question presented
by these cases is whether § 554 "permit[s] the abandonment
of property of the bankrupt estate in contravention of state
and local environmental protections laws." 739 F. 2d, at
913. The dissenting judge noted-properly, we think-that
in large part the underlying dispute in both cases centers on
who is going to pay for cleaning up the dangerous situation
generated by Quanta's prepetition viola}i9Jls of state and
local law. In No. 84-805, New York haftllready cleaned up
the site and expended $2.5 million in the process. In
No. 84-801, after we granted certiorari, New Jersey apparently began a partial cleanup in cooperation with the federal
Environmental Protection Agency.
The majority of the
Court of Appeals declined to address what priority status
should be given the States' present and future claims for reimbursement. While both state law and federal bankruptcy
law are implicated in the ultimate resolution of this question
of priority-a question that is not presented on the record before us-"abandonment" simply is not. The decision below
freights a trustee's decision to abandon burdensome property, and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of that decision,
with complex considerations quite foreign to the concerns of
§554.
Abandonment is "the release from the debtor's estate of
property previously included in that estate." 2 W. Norton,

84-801 & 84-805-0PINION
6

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 39.01 (1985), citing Brown v.
O'Keefe, 300 U. S. 598, 602-603 (1937). Prior to enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there was no statutory provision specifically authorizing abandonment in liquidation
cases. By analogy to the trustee's statutory power to reject
executory contracts, courts had developed a rule permitting
the trustee to abandon property that was worthless or not
expected to sell for a price sufficiently in excess of encumbrances to offset the costs of administration. 4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 554.01 (15th ed. 1985) (hereinafter Collier).' This judge-made rule served the overriding purpose
of bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the assets of the debtor's property to money, for equitable distribution to creditors, Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224,
227 (1930). 4 Collier ~ 554.01. Forcing the trustee to administer burdensome property would contradict this purpose, slowing the administration of the estate and draining
its assets.
The Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes abandonment
for the first time in the history of bankruptcy legislation.
The relevant provision for present purposes provides in full:
"(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." 2
'Under the former Bankruptcy Act, title to the debtor's property
vested in the trustee. Abandonment divested the trustee of title and revested it in the debtor. 4 Collier ~ 554.02[2]. Under the Code, the
trustee no longer takes title to the debtor's property, 11 U. S. C. § 541,
and he is simply divested of control over the property by the abandonment.
Although § 554 does not specify to whom the property is abandoned, the
legislative history suggests that it is to the person having a possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978);
Ohio v. Kovacs, 459 U . S . - , - n. 12 (1985).
2
Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after "value" in
§ 554(a). Pub. L. 98-353, Tit. III, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 380 (1984).
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This language, absolute in its tenns, suggests that a trustee's
power to abandon is limited only by considerations of the
property's value to the estate. It makes no mention of other
factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no easy inference that Congress was concerned about state environmental
regulations. 3 Indeed, when Congress was so concerned it
expressed itself clearly, specifically exempting some environmental injunctions from the automatic stay provisions of § 362
of the Code, 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4), (5). See Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U. S . - (1985).
Nor does the scant legislative history of§ 554 support the
Court of Appeals' interpretation. Now here does that legislative history suggest that Congress intended to limit the
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property where
abandonment might be opposed by those charged with the
exercise of state police or regulatory powers.
Respondents seek to turn the seemingly unqualified language and the absence of helpful legislative history to their
advantage. Adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals,
they argue that in light of Congress' failure to elaborate,
§ 554 must have been intended to codify prior "abandonment"
a Last Term in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. (1985), which involved
the dischargeability of certain environmental injunctions in bankruptcy, we
briefly addressed the abandonment of hazardous waste sites:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
to the estate. 11 U. S. C. § 554. Such abandonment is to the person having the possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 92
(1978). . . . If the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee
would shortly determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the
property was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with
state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the
buyer would clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation
[the debtor] might have had to clean up the property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the
trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability."
/d., a t - n. 12.

84-801 & 84-80&--0PINION
8

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

case law, and that under prior law the trustee's power to
abandon was subject to "'the application of general regulations of a police nature.'" Quanta I, 739 F. 2d, at 916, quoting 4AJ. Moore, Collier on Bankruptcy ~70.42[2], at 502-504
(14th ed. 1978). This line of argument is unconvincing. We
have previously expressed our unwillingness to read into unqualified statutory language exceptions or limitations based
upon legislative history unless that legislative history demonstrates with extraordinary clarity that this was indeed the intent of Congress. E. g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S.
--,at--, slip op. at 5 (1984). We think that upon analysis the "legislative history" relied upon by respondents here
falls far short of this standard.
The three cases upon which both respondents and the quotation from Collier rely simply do not stand for the sweeping
In
proposition ascribed to them by the text writer.
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 1952), the
Court of Appeals held that a trustee might not abandon
worthless barges obstructing traffic in the Baltimore Harbor
if the abandonment would have constituted a violation of federallaw. Characterizing the doctrine of abandonment as judicially created, the court said:
"The judge-made rule must give way when it comes into
conflict with a statute enacted in order to ensure the
safety of navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden
imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract,
but a duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the public interest." 198
F. 2d, at 290.

In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (ED
Pa. 1974), was a bankruptcy court decision concluding that
the principle of Ottenheimer did not apply because there was
no conflicting statute. The court nonetheless held that since
the right to abandon was based on judge-made law, the court
was free to protect the public interest by requiring a trustee
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seeking abandonment to first spend funds of the estate to seal
manholes and vents in an underground pipe network. In In
re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA7), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the District Court sitting in bankruptcy had authorized the bankrupt to abandon a lease of a
rail line, and a lessor appealed. The bankrupt did not appeal
the District Court's imposition of conditions on the ~b~ndonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed .the ~istrict
Court's authorization of abandonment, and while there may
be dicta in its opinion that would support respondent's position, the holding of the case certainly does not.
Ottenheimer depended on the need to reconcile a conflict
between a judicial gloss on the Bankruptcy Act and the commands of another federal statute. We implicitly confirmed
the validity of such an approach two Terms ago in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 523-524 (1984). But that
principle is far narrower than the broad doctrine for which
Ottenheimer was cited in the quotation from Collier on Bankruptcy-that a trustee's power to abandon is subject to "the
application of general regulations of a police nature."
Lewis Jones admittedly went further, on a different line of
reasoning, but we do not believe that the isolated decision of
a single bankruptcy court rises to the level of "established
law" that we can fairly assume Congress intended to incorporate. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 379-382 (1982). In addition, both
Ottenheimer and Lewis Jones relied heavily on the fact that
the pre-Code law of abandonment was judge-made, which in
turn raises the somewhat Delphic inquiry as to whether these
cases would have been decided the same way by those courts
under the present Code.
It may be argued, of course, that it is the quotation from
Collier, albeit inaccurately characterizing the decided cases,
that Congress wanted to incorporate into the Code. Congress may if it wishes adopt the judgment of a commentator
that the decided cases under an existing federal statute ought

I
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to be subject to a particular exception, so long as Congress'
intent appears in the usual statutory materials. But the
statement in Collier relied on here did not purport to make an
independent judgment as to the desirability of qualifying the
trustee's authority to abandon; it purported only to describe
existing case law.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it must be noted
that the only reference to Collier was not in the legislative
history of the present Code, but in that of an early precursor
of § 554, § 4-611 of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973,
H. R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181, reprinted in A. Resnick & E. Wypanski, 2 Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978: A Legislative History, Doc. No. 22 (1979). And
the proposition for which the section in Collier is cited is not
the view that authority for abandonment is qualified by state
police power, but instead the much less remarkable proposition that "[t]he concept of abandonment is well recognized in
the case law. See 4A Collier§ 70.42[3]." A Senator or Congressman seeking to familiarize himself with the statutory
provision for abandonment in the Code, therefore, in order to
divine that the statutory power to abandon was to be conditioned on compliance with state police power regulations,
would not merely have had to look at the legislative history of
the precursor to the Code, but also would have had to read
the several-page treatise section cited in that earlier legislative history.
This reference to the since superseded version of Collier is
simply too attenuated, for the various reasons we have
stated, to support the inference that Congress, while writing
§ 554 in unqualified terms, intended to incorporate so broad
and uncertain an exception to the abandonment authority of
the trustee. Congress knew how to draft an exemption covering the exercise of police powers when it wanted to. See
11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4), (5); supra, a t - . It also knew how
to draft a qualified abandonment provision. See id.,
§ 1170(a)(2) (abandonment of railroad lines permitted only if
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Its failure to so qual-

ify § 554 indicates that Congress intended the relevant in-

quiry at an abandonment hearing to be limited to whether the
property is burdensome and of inconsequential value to the
estate.
Respondents also seek support from 28 U. S. C. § 959(b),
which provides that "a trustee . . . shall manage and operate
the property . . . according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the state in which such property is situated." "Management," the argument runs, surely embraces the trustee's
abandonment of property; where abandonment violates state
law, as it does here,• the trustee is without authority to
abandon. For their part, petitioners contend that § 959 is inapplicable to a trustee's actions taken in the course of liquidation, citing 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice
~66.04[4], at 1913 (2d ed. 1985) ("959(b) applies only to the
receiver is his operation of property in his possession ...
[not] to the distribution of the estate"). But whether or not
temporary management or operation of a facility during liquidation is governed by § 959(b}-a question we need not and
do not decide-the trustee's filing of a petition to abandon
does not constitute "manage[ment]" or "operat[ion]." Not
only would a contrary holding strain the language of§ 959(b),
cf. In re Adelphi Hospital Corp., 579 F. 2d 726, 729 n. 6
(CA2 1978) (per curiam) (in pre-Code liquidation proceeding
'New York and NJDEP contend that the "act" of abandonment itself
violates state law. They argue that by revesting control over the property to an assetless Quanta, unable to act with respect to the site, abandonment constitutes "disposal" of the hazardous wastes in contravention of
state law, seeN. Y. Envir. Conserv. Law§§ 71-2702, 71-2713 (McKinney
1984); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-3, -4 (West 1979). To the extent that
these laws in fact ·equate abandonment with unlawful "disposal," they are
the equivalent of laws expressly barring abandonment of hazardous waste
sites and plainly frustrate federal bankruptcy policy as expressed in § 554,
see discussion in text at - - . Assuming that respondents correctly characterize the effect of these laws, the laws would be preempted if
applied here. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 644 (1971).
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trustee "is in no sense a manager of an institution's operations"), it also would create an exception to the abandonment
power without a shred of evidence that Congress intended to
do so. As one commentator has noted, § 554(a) "is among
the few provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that do not contain explicit exceptions." Note, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 870, 883
(1985). We decline to read 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) as creating
an implicit exception. 5
Finally, citing SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455 (1940), respondents argue that
the Bankruptcy Court's equitable powers support the result
reached below. We disagree. While the Bankruptcy Court
is a court of equity, the Bankruptcy Code "does not authorize
free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity."
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S., at 527. The Bankruptcy
Court may not, in the exercise of its equitable powers, enforce its view of sound public policy at the expense of the interests the Code is designed to protect. In these cases, it is
undisputed that the properties in question were burdensome
and of inconsequential value to the estate. Forcing the
trustee to expend estate assets to clean up the sites would
plainly be contrary to the purposes of the Code. See supra,
at--.
We emphasize that our holding does not render a bankruptcy court powerless to prevent a trustee from surreptitiously abandoning a toxic waste site, leaving the public unaware and unprotected. Requiring the trustee to notify the
relevant authorities before abandoning, for example, is per5
In the Court of Appeals, New York sought reimbursement for its
cleanup cost as an "administrative expense" of the estate under 11 U. S. C.
§ 503(b). In particular, it argued that those costs were "actual, necessary
costs of preserving the estate." ld., §503(b)(l)(A). The Court of Appeals declined to address this claim, and New York now presses the more
modest argument that § 503(b)(l)(A) authorizes the trustee to expend estate assets to maintain or clean up the property in question. Whether or
not it provides such authority, however, § 503(b)(l)(A) surely offers no independent ground for forcing the trustee to retain burdensome property.
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fectly consistent with the Code. Such a requirement advances the state's interest in protecting the public health and
safety by permitting it to step in and at least maintain the
status quo, and at the same time allows for the orderly liquidation and distribution of the estate's assets. Here, of
course, the trustee provided such notice and the relevant authorities were afforded an opportunity to take appropriate
preventative and remedial measures.
Our holding likewise does not exclude the possibility that
there may be a far narrower condition on the abandonment
power than that advanced by respondents here, such as
where abandonment by the trustee might itself create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be uniquely able to
guard against. The United States in its brief as amicus curiae suggests, for example, that there are limits upon the authority of a trustee to abandon dynamite sitting on a furnace
in the basement of a schoolhouse. Although we know of no
cases in which trustees have sought to abandon dynamite
under such circumstances, the existence of the narrow exception which we reserve would surely embrace that situation.
Respondents' interest in these cases lies not just in protecting public health and safety but also in protecting the
public fisc. In No. 84-805, before undertaking cleanup efforts, New York unsuccessfully sought from the Bankruptcy
Court a first lien on the Long Island City property to the extent of any expenditures it might make to bring the site into
compliance with state and local law. New York did not appeal the Court's denial of a first lien and proceeded to clean
up the site (except for the contaminated subsoil). It now
presses a claim for reimbursement, maintaining that the
trustee should not have been allowed to abandon the site.
NJDEP, in No. 84-801, apparently seeks to undo the abandonment and force the trustee to expend the estate's remaining assets cleaning up the site, thereby reducing the cleanup
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costs that must ultimately be born by the State. 6
Barring abandonment and forcing a cleanup, however,
would effectively place respondents' interest in protecting
the public fisc ahead of the claims of other creditors. Congress simply did not intend that § 554 abandonment hearings
would be used to establish the priority of particular claims in
bankruptcy. While states retain considerable latitude to ensure that priority status is allotted to their cleanup claims,
see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. --,--,slip op. at 1 (1985)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring), they may not accomplish that result by imposing conditions on the abandonment power that
Congress never contemplated.
.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these
cases is
Reversed.

1

NJDEP does not contend that the estate, including any assets otherwise subject to Midlantic's secured claim, contains sufficient assets to complete the cleanup.
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84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic National Bank
My reaction to your first draft that I reviewed
last night is generally favorable.

In addition to editing

and a number of marginal questions, I have the following
comments:
1.

Your first sentence is an example of your "sa-

tirical power" -a verbal "bomb shell".

Unless there is

clear record support for the contrast you draw, it should be
substantially tempered or omitted.

Even with record sup-

port, the language may be a little injudicious although it
will certainly "grab" the reader's attention!
2.

A reader will understand our dissent better if

the first paragraph states clearly what the Court holds.
Then, if there is support for your present first sentence,
we can put it in a footnote if it is toned down a bit.
3.

In the early part of the draft there are too

few citations to the record, or to statutes or cases to support some of the statements.
4.

The cases cited to establish the "common law"

rule are - for the most part - a bit old, and absent quotations of relevant language in the decisions, are not partieularly persuasive.

I hope there is some quotable language,

•'

2.

and also some express indication that these cases can be
viewed as applying a common law rule.

I do not believe the

draft states explicitly what the "rule" is.

I assume you

have relied on the same cases cited by the SG for the common
law rule.
5.

Part III is predicated on the view that the

Court's opinion confers "unrestricted abandonment power upon
a trustee".

As I only hurriedly skimmed the Court's opinion

when it was first circulated (and did not have it at home
with me last night) , I do not know whether this is a fair
statement of what the Court holds without any qualification.
6.

As I have had no bankruptcy experience, and no

occasion since coming on the Court to become familiar with
bankruptcy law, I am fortunate to have a clerk who took the
bankruptcy course in law school.

This does place a somewhat

greater responsibility on you than normally would be the
case.

If there can be reasonable differences of opinion as

to some of your statements as to bankruptcy law you might
brief me on these or suggest what I should read.

* * *
Despite what is said above, I think your first
draft basically is good and I commend you on the promptness
with which you completed a first draft.
me a month?

L.F.P., Jr.
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No. 84-801 - Midlantic Bank v. N.J. Department
of Environmental Protection
No. 84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York
Dear Bill:
I join.
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copie~

to the Conference

CCC

12/19/85

84-801, Midlantic Corp. v. NJ Dep't Envtl. Protection

Two

issues have arisen

in converting your dissent

into a Court opinion.

1.
rect

Limited Effect of the Holding.

decision

to

condition

abandonment

on

The Court's corcompliance with

certain regulatory laws may often have little ultimate effect
on bankrupt's

handling

area of concern.

Here,

of

toxic

waste dumps

for example,

-

the primary

a restriction on aban-

donment would have forced the trustee only to hold onto the
property until the

liquidation was completed.

Upon conclu-

sion of the proceedings, the mortgage holders would have the
option of repossessing the sites.

They would decline.

The

property would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor,
and

then

that

shell would

dissolve.

The State would

then

have to clean up.
I recommend that you consider acknowledging this in
the opinion.

---------

scope of

~nowledgment

underscores the limited

~ .-

J~ ~

~

the restriction the Court has read into the Bank- .?t-~

ruptcy Code: Abandonment is conditioned upon compliance w i th &-1. c.certain regulatory laws,

but the Court

is not altering

th~

priorities of creditors' claims beyond the immediate effect M-6--1- t.uJ,.
of a restricted abandonment.

Second,

are~
restric-~

lower courts that

unfamiliar with bankruptcy will not believe that a

tion on abandonment inevitably leads to cleanup by the debt-

page 2.

or.

Finally, the acknowledgment signals that the Court has

followed

the

implications of

its holding

through the bank-

ruptcy proceeding and is aware of what the holding does and
doesn't mean.

Laws for Public Health &

2.

_____

~~
~~

Something more

needs to be said about the nature of ......._
laws
tute

conditions

on

abandonment.

consti-

My beli

we can

~-~

state that any statute or regulation reason

p~

pretermits the abandonment power.

This state-

ment would nof encompass abandonment that creates ~ iRde~ermin.a te

harm.

~

Qt'

1

dL--

speculative

danger,

and

would

preclude

a

/lc;~~

,__/,---.

state's limiting abandonment power with laws that carried a
mere label of "Public Health and Safety" but bore little relation to that welfare.

I

can continue

to work on

into Friday before coming

against

much more

these

to say on both

the Court opinion well
these

subjects,

issues.
but will

There

is

rever~

elaboration unless and until you believe that you would

bene- ~~

~all-.

fit from it.

December 19, 1985

·.:·

?-W!-

Cabell

Argued Case Supp.

~tm:t afoltri of f!rt ~b .ihdt.s
,ru~ ~.
2ll~,.~

ar.

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ...

.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

December 30, 1985

No. 84-801) Midlantic
) National Bank
) v. New Jersey
) DeEartment of
) Environmental
) Protection
)

O'Neill
No. 84-805) v. New York
)

Dear Lewis,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.:hvrmu <qomt ltf t4~ ~mu~ ~taUs
Jhtsfrmgttm. ~. (!f.

2ll6l~$

CHAMBERS OF"

December 30, 1985

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 84-801) Midatlantic Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection
No. 84-805) O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

v

~~~~mm~t~t~mub~mug

Jll«tJrht:gtett. ~ . ~· 2.0:~~$
C HAM BER S OF

December 30, 1985

J U S TI C E HARR Y A . BLACK M U N

Re:

No. 84-801) Midatlantic Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection
No. 84-805) O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Lewis:
By separate note, I am joining your opinion.
Although of no great consequence, two matters concern
me:
(1) I do not understand the reference to "Post, at 5" in
the center of page 7.
(2) In the fourth line of page 4 is a
reference to 11 u.s.c. §405(c) (1) (B).
I believe there is no
such section.
There is one in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. Bill Rehnquist had the correct reference, I think, at
the top of page 4 of his proposed majority opinion as recirculated December 4.

<D

Po~t

o:1 "B -9

G) ~ 40~ (')U)(~) ~ ~

~CAM\~ A~ CJ\ \~ 1~

Justice Powell

'-...._

.ilupr.ruu Clf&tlttt &rf tift ~t.tb .tltatt•

,rulfiqhm. ~. Qf. 2ll?"''
CHAMBERS 01""

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 7, 1986

Re:

Dear Lewis:
There is some question in my mind ~bout the
exact reach of the holding in your proposed opinion.
The pre-1978 abandonment cases that you discuss, and
in particular the Chicago Rapid Transit case and the
Lewis Jones case, suggest that there can be no
abandonment without imposing appropriate conditions.
Although the Ottenheimer case seems to suggest that
there can be no abandonment at all when it would
violate an independent safety rule, the safety rule
in that case simply required the debtor "to care for
or dispose of [the property] in the manner prescribed
by the statute." 198 F.2d, at 290.
In this case, as you point out on page 3 and in
footnote 3, no conditions were imposed. Thus, this
abandonment was plainly improper. But what if the
bankruptcy 'ud e had imposed co d't ons that re uired
th
ustee to ma1nta1n t e guard service and make
enoug temporary repatrs to orestall ·any immtnent
danger o a ertous ragedy? The last paragraph of
your opinion seems to state that such an abandonment
would also be impermissible.
I found that I could not subscribe to Bill
Rehnquist's proposed disposition because it seemed to
authorize the trustee to abandon without any
constraint whatsoever imposed by State law. You have
convinced me that that position is untenable. I am
inclined to believe that the opposite extreme would
be e ually unsatisfactory. Speci 1cally, I could not
su sc 1 e o a o 1ng that the State could veto any
aban
, no matter ow many sa ety precaut1ons
I

1
I

~

- 2 -

were taken and no matter how much money the estate
had spent in an effort to rectify the problem. At
some point it will become necessary to close the
estate and at that time there may be no alternative
to an abandonment that violates State law.l
Thus, I wonder if it might be wise to nnrr
holding by stating explicitly (1) that it was
to authori~ent without imposing
safety conditions and (2) that we are no
that there are no circumstances that could ever
justify an abandonment that may violate State law-there may be cases in which an estate could not
otherwise be closed.
,.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

lThe underlying dispute, of course, is how to finance the
cleanup costs that must be incurred as a consequence of the
debtor's pre-bankruptcy conduct. That dispute will be affected
by .both State and Federal rules of law that have not been brought
to our attention in this proceedjng, and we obviously cannot say
very much about it.
(My very tentative assumption is that those
costs can properly be assessed against the unencumbered assets of
the estate, but probably not against secured creditors.) In any
event, it seems to me that it may have been error for the
Bankruptcy Court to approve the abandonment without first
deciding, at least in a general way, how the cleanup costs were
to be allocated.

~upuuu

C!Jaurl af Uft ~nittlt ~hd:tlt
'J)rulfin:ghtn. ~. C!J. 2ll,;t~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 7, 1986

Re:

84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey De?artment of
Environmental Protection
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Lewis:
There is some question in my mind about the
exact reach of the holding in your proposed opinion.
The pre-1978 abandonment cases that you discuss, and
in particular the Chicago Rapid Transit case and the
Lewis Jones case, suggest that there can be no
abandonment wi~t imposin~ appropriate conditions.
Altfiougn the Otterifie1mer case seems to suggest that
there can be no abandonment at all when it would
violate an independent safety rule, the safety ~ule
in that case simply required the debtor "to car• for
or dispose of [the property] in the manner prescribed
by the statute." 198 F.2d, at 290.
In 1bj§-Case, as you point out on page 3 and in
footnote 3, no conditions were~osed. Thus, this
abandonment was plainly improper. But what if the
bankruptcy judge had imposed conditions that required
the trustee to maintain the guard service and make
enough temporary repairs to forestall any imminent
danger of a serious tragedy? The last paragraph of
your opinion seems to state that such an abandonment
would also be impermissible.
I found that I could not subscribe to Bill
Rehnquist's proposed disposition because it seemed to
authorize the trustee to abandon without any
constraint whatsoever imposed by State law. You have
convinced me that that position is untenable. I am
inclined to believe that the opposite extreme would
be equally unsatisfactory. Specifically, I could not
subscribe to a holding that the State could veto any
abandonment, no matter how many safety precautions

-

2 -

were taken and no matter how mu h money the estate
had spent in an effort to rect'fy the problem. At
some point it will become nece sary to close the
estate and at that time there ay be no alternative
to an abandonment that violate State law.l
Thus, I wonder if it mig
be wise to narrow our
holding by stating explicitly (1) that it was error
to authorize the abandonment ithout imposing ~ ~
safety conditions and (2) th t we are not holding
that there are no circumstances that could ever
justify an abandonment that may violate State law-there may be cases in which an estate could not
otherwise be closed.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

lThe underlying dispute, of course, is how to finance the
cleanup costs that must be incurred as a consequence of the
debtor's pre-bankruptcy conduct. That dispute will be affected
by both State and Federal rules of law that have not been brought
to our attention in this proceeding, and we obviously cannot say
very much about it.
(My very tentative assumption is that those
costs can properly be assessed against the unencumbered assets of
the estate, but probably not against secured creditors.) In any
event, it seems to me that it may have been error for the
Bankruptcy Court to approve the abandonment without first
deciding, at least in a general way, how the cleanup costs were
to be allocated.

'
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84-801, Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N,.J. Dept. of E.P.
84-805, O'Neill v. City of N.Y.
Justice Steven's Letter of Jan. 7, 1985

Justice Stevens has sent a letter that I interpret as an
expression of concern over the exact bredth of the Court's holding.

I believe that Justice Stevens is especially concerned that

a state might be able to obtain a "super-priority" on the estate
of a debtor by enacting multi tudenous laws labelled "For Public
Health And Safety."

Because this is an issue that you specifi-

cally considered, and because your thoughts are close to those I
attribute to Justice Stevens,

I believe only some minor changes

are necessary.
I

have

vens' clerk.

taken

the

liberty of

talking with Justice Ste-

Although I may not be clear on exactly what changes

would satisfy Justice Stevens, the clerk was concerned about the
discussions
changes

ot

Ottenheimer and § 959.

Accordingly, I suggest the

indicated on pages 6 and 10 of the attached draft.

To

the extent it was appropriate for him to do so, Justice Stevens'
clerk expressed a belief that these changes would help answer the
concerns in the January 7th letter.
Beyond

those

sections,

Justice

Stevens'

main

concern

seems to be that we are holding a trustee may never abandon property

in

contravention

of

State

law.

Your

language

limits

the

trumping of federal bankruptcy to "a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety

from

every

identified hazards."

state

law

trumps

the

You also say in note 11 that not
abandonment power.

1 believe

that

page 2.

these qualifications,

in conjunction with the changes on pages 6

(!)J\.N

and 10,

i~

sufficient.

If not, elaboration in footnote 11 would

be appropriate.
I do not believe that abandonment is permissible if the
trustee takes steps "to forestall any imminent danger of a serious tragedy."
abandoning

,I

Letter of Jan. 7

the

property

fire-suppression

while

system,

save on these expenses.

The notion of a trustee's

maintaining

a

guard

service

as suggested by Justice Stevens,

Here

self-contradictory.

2.

the

and

seems

trustee abandoned the property to

In a more general sense, I perceive your

opinion as holding that an abandonment may not threaten the publie's health or safety.

If Justice Stevens actually means that

abandonment may be conditioned only on "forestall[ing] any imminent danger of serious tragedy," we may have to fight with Justice Rehnquist again for Justice Stevens' vote.
The last two paragraphs of Justice Stevens' letter show
a

belief

that

the

debtor's

estate

cannot

be

closed

until

the

~-------------------~----------------------------------property
is abandoned or brought into compliance with the applicable state laws.
I researched this question, and found that the
~
probable course of events would be for the debtor to retain the
real property until all other affairs pertaining to the liquidation were completed.
conclude

the

At that point,

liquidation proceedings

tained real property.

the bankruptcy court would
without

regard

to the

re-

Mortgage holders on the property (or their

equivalent for personal property) would then have the opportunity
If they refused,

the property

would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor.

Because the

to secure title to the property.

page

shell would

be without

assets,

the

ul~imate

.J.

responsibility and

liability for cleanup would be imposed upon the State.

The State

would not have effective financial recourse for repayment.

Crim-

inal proceedings would be possible against officers of the corporation, if appropriate under the facts and authorized by statute.
1 do not know to what extent this line of thought has influenced
Justice Stevens.

1 have spoken with his clerk about my views on

the bankruptcy proceedings outlined above.
Justice Stevens mentions in a footnote that the "underlying dispute" is how to finance the cleanup.
in an earlier draft:
be

said

Chambers

to

reduce

Draft

3

You mentioned this

"The ultimate issue in this litigation may

to

the

n. 2

priority

(forebear

of

creditors'

claims."

of present n. 2).

If

See

Justice

Stevens feels the need to say more than the present note 2, perhaps we can resurrect some of the older language.

1 did not spe-

~---------------------------------·
cifically propose
this change to Justice Stevens' clerk, because
1 am not sure Justice Stevens believes note 2 is insufficient.
Justice Stevens will be back in town tomorrow.
to your approval,

Subject

1 will propose the changes on page 6 and 10,

and hope for the best.

January 7, 1986; 4:39 PM

Cabell

Op. Supp.
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84-801, Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N.J. Dept. of E.P.
84-805, O'Neill v. City of N.Y.
Justice Steven's Letter of Jan. 7, 1985

Justice Stevens has sent a letter that I interpret as an
expression of concern over the exact bredth of the Court's holding.

I believe that Justice Stevens is especially concerned that

a state might be able to obtain a "super-priority" on the estate
of a debtor by enacting multitudenous laws labelled "For Public
Health And Safety."

Because this is an issue that you specifi-

cally considered, and because your thoughts are close to those I
attribute to Justice Stevens,

I believe only some minor changes

are necessary.
I

have

vens' clerk.

taken

the

liberty of

talking with Justice

Ste-

Although I may not be clear on exactly what changes

would satisfy Justice Stevens, the clerk was concerned about the
discussions on Ottenheimer and
changes

§

959.

Accordingly, I suggest the

indicated on pages 6 and 10 of the attached draft.

To

the extent it was appropriate for him to do so, Justice Stevens'
clerk expressed a belief that these changes would help answer the
concerns in the January 7th letter.
Beyond

those

sections,

Justice

Stevens'

main

concern

seems to be that we are holding a trustee may never abandon property

in

contravention

of

State

law.

Your

language

limits

the

trumping of federal bankruptcy to "a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or· safety from identified hazards."
every

state

law

trumps

the

You also say in note 11 that not
abandonment

power.

I

believe

that

page

.t..

in conjunction with the changes on pages 6

these qualifications,

'

and 10, are sufficient.

If not, elaboration in footnote 11 would

be appropriate.
I do not believe that abandonment is permissible if the
trustee takes steps "to forestall any imminent danger of a serious tragedy."
abandoning

,I 2.

Letter of Jan. 7

the

property

fire-suppression

while

system,

self-contradictory.

maintaining

a

guard

service

as suggested by Justice Stevens,

Here

save on these expenses.

The notion of a trustee's

the

and

seems

trustee abandoned the property to

In a more general sense, I perceive your

opinion as holding that an abandonment may not threaten the publie's health or safety.

If Justice Stevens actually means that

abandonment may be conditioned only on "forestall[ing] any imminent danger of serious tragedy," we may have to fight with Justice Rehnquist again for Justice Stevens' vote.
The last two paragraphs of Justice Stevens' letter show
a

belief

that

the

debtor's

estate

cannot

be

closed

until

the

property is abandoned or brought into compliance with the applicable state laws.

I researched this question, and found that the

probable course of events would be for

the debtor to retain the

real property until all other affairs pertaining to the liquidation were completed.
conclude

the

At that point,

liquidation proceedings

tained real property.

the bankruptcy court would
without regard

to the

re-

Mortgage holders on the property (or their

equivalent for personal property) would then have the opportunity
If they refused,

the property

would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor.

Because the

to secure title to the property.

page

shell would

be without

assets,

the ultimate

.:S.

responsibility and

liability for cleanup would be imposed upon the State.

The State

would not have effective financial recourse for repayment.

Crim-

inal proceedings would be possible against officers of the corporation, if appropriate under the facts and authorized by statute.
1 do not know to what extent this line of thought has influenced
Justice Stevens.

1 have spoken with his clerk about my views on

the bankruptcy proceedings outlined above.
Justice Stevens mentions in a footnote that the "underlying dispute" is how to finance the cleanup.
in an earlier draft:
be

said

Chambers

to

reduce

Draft

3

You mentioned this

"The ultimate issue in this litigation may

to

the

n. 2

priority

(forebear

of

of

creditors'

present

claims."

n. 2).

1f

See

Justice

Stevens feels the need to say more than the present note 2, perhaps we can resurrect some of the older language.

1 did not spe-

cifically propose this change to Justice Stevens' clerk, because
1 am not sure Justice Stevens believes note 2 is insufficient.
Justice Stevens will be back in town tomorrow.
to your approval,

Subject

1 will propose the changes on page 6 and 10,

and hope for the best.

January 8, 1986; 8:48 AM

Cabell

Op. Supp .

.'

. ·. .
~
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when loeallaw required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
'1:17 (Bkrtey Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The nonnal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judieially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Ed'TTUYrlds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in eon- .
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\
Altha.lgh these cases
oo not define for us
the exact ocntours of
the trustee. s abandcn. :nent power, they do make
clear that this power
was subject ·to certain
restricticns when Congress enacted~ 554(a).

·Ill
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to

84-801 &: 84-806-0PINION
10
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in
possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of
the State." The petitioners have contended that §959(b) is
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and ''operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,339
(1979), and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase '"rnanage[ment]' of the 'property,"'
coqld not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
Secticn 959 (b) does not, of state law.• The J)Feeef)t ef § 959(9) is elear; "[T]he g:eals ef
of course, delimit the
~e feaeP&l . bftnlEPI:if)tey laws, iBehulmg rehabiBtatieR ef the
precise conditions on an aeeteP, ae Ret &l:lthePise tPimBgf'eSSi9R ef stat.e }&V;.s settmg
~~ ~~ (a)PeEI~ffieBtS fep. the epei'BtieB. ef tfie B\ismess, e¥eR if the
Secticn 959 (b) Is limita- . eeBbfll:lea epe1'8'b6ft ef the Bl:lSHless wel:lla ee tfiwel"tea ey
ticn, ~, supports ·applying state laws " Chid
oor finding that Ccngress - - - did not intend for the
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situBankruptcy OXie to pre--ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
enpt all state laws.
bound to do if in possession thereof."
'See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
-, (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
'SeeS. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No.7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).

84-801 cl 84-805-QPINION
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

We also 'Walld have a
different case when a
bankruptcy calrt autho-

rized abaOOament conditiooed l.JtXIl the trustee IS adequately protecting the p.lblic 1 s
health and safety.

u

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by

§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The

abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm. A

Januarv 9, 1986

84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic Rank, et seq.

Dear John:
Your letter of January 7 is hel:oful.
I agree that abandonm~nt could be authorized where
appropr late steps \\'ere takE'n \-lith the approval of the bankruptcy court to protect the health and safety of the public.
I enclose xerox copies of pages 6, 10 and 12 of my
draft of December 30 on which I have indicated changes. I
believ~ tl-tese meet your concerns.
I wtll, of course, consider any language changes you may suggest.
Sincerely,

Just ice Stevens
lfp/ss

(•

,,

~upuuu

(!J11url1tf Urt ~nittb .:itattll
'~lhte<4htgfun. ~. <!J. 21l~J!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 14, 1986

Re:

84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Lewis:
As always, I am grateful for your willingness to
try to accommodate my concerns. I think your
proposed change on~page 6 is ~ne but I am still
somewhat ~oubled both by th~eliance on§ 959(b)
and by t~ breadth of the concluding paragraph in the
opinion.
With respect to§ 959(b), I wonder if instead of
squarely holding that the section applies to
abandonment--a holqing which I really think is quite
doubtful--would it not be sufficient merely to ! ely
o it as additional evidence that Congress d i d not
inten the Ban ruptcy o e to preempt all state laws.
It seems to me that this point could be made by
(1 eliminating the paragraph that now appears on page 10
and s i mply add l n g a t the end of the preceding
paragraph the substance of the sentence that you have
proposed as an additional insert. In other words,
_ n 11
perhaps the run-over paragraph hat en
with the
~
sentence reading something like th1s·
"Even though
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment
under § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code--and therefore
does not delimit the precise conditions on an
abandonment--the section nevertheless supports o~r .
conclusion that Congress did not intend ~e ·--- tz'Y"
Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws that
otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's
powers."
(Perhaps in the first line of page 10,
instead of merely noting that§ 959(b) commands "the
debtor in possession" to comply with state law, it
01(
might be appropriate to insert the word "trustee"
because that word does appear in§ 959(b)).

l

~

7
·

- 2 -

Would you also consider a rev1s1on of the final
paragraph in the opinion to read this way:

1
J

"In the light of the restricted pre-1978
abandonment power of the Bankruptcy trustee and in
the context of the limited scope of other Bankruptcy
Code provisions, we conclude that the trustee's
general duty to comply with state law, including
State environmental laws, is applicable in the
abandonment context. Congress did not intend
§ 554(a} as a total preemption of all conflicting
state and local laws. The Bankruptcy Court does not
have the power to authorize a ~ bandonment without
d- lmaking anj effort tOT formulat~~~onditions that will
adequately protect t he public s health and safety.
Accordingly, without reaching the question whether
state laws imposing conditions on abandonment that
may be so onerous as to interfere with the Bankruptcy
adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not
abandon property in contravention of a state statute
or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect
the public health or safety from identified
hazards.11J Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Thi r d Circuit."
Jd./"This exception to the abandonment power
vested in the trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It
does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate
future violation of such laws that may stem from
abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably
calculated to protect the public health or safety
from imminent and identifiable harm."
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

{T/l
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 15, 1986

No. 84-801 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Departrrent of Environrrental Protection
No. 84-805 O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Bill,
Please join rre in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

January 15, 1986

84-801 Midlantic
Rider A, p. 12

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's

re~tricted

pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Conqress did
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state anrl local laws.
The Banl<ruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that wlll adequately protect the public's health and

~afety.

Accor~inq

ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws
imposing conditions on abandonment may be ao onerous as to
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold
that a trustee may not abandon proPerty in contravention

of

a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to
protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.l

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

January 15, 1986

84-801 Midlantic
Rider A, P• 10

Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code -and therefore
does not delimit the precise cone'Ht i.ons on an

aban~onment

-

the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not in tend for the Bank ruptcv Code to

pre~mpt

1'!11

state laws that otherw-i.se constrain the exercise of a trust-

ee's powers.

January 15, 1986

84-801 Midlantic Bank

Dear John:
I will be glad to make the changes suggested in
your letter of ,January 14.
I enclose two
full paragraph on page
the final paragraph on
sional language change

riders:

one that would replace the

101 and a second that would replace

page 12. I have made only an occain what you suggest.

I am assuming that these changes will be satisfactory to Bill Brennan and Barry who have joinerl me, as I view
your language as a clearer statement of what the opinion
already purports to say. I appreciate your. interest and
assistance.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss

j;upr~m~ Qj:ll'nd ttf Ur~ 'Jitnilt~ ' j;taf~g
Jragfrittgtttn. ~. Q):. 2!lbi'!,1
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 17, 1986

Re:

84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

1~L
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,jtqtrttttt <qtturl ttf tJrt ~tb ,jtalt$'

~lfinghtn. ~. <q. 2ll~J!.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

v

January 17, 1986

84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

J;u.prtmt atou.d of tqt 11Utittb .§tatts

'lla:sfrington.18.

or.

/
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 21,1986

Re:

Nos. 84-801 and 84-805-Midlantic v. New Jersey
and O'Neill v. New York

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

84-801 Midlantic Bank v. New Jersey Dept.
WHR for
1st
2nd
3rd

the Court 10/19/85
draft 11/15/85
draft 11/21/85
draft 12/4/85
Joined by SOC 11/15/85
BRW ll/18/85
CJ 12/4/85
LFP dissenting
1st draft 11/26/85
Joined by WJB 11/26/85
HAB llj29j85
TM 12/2/85
LFP will dissent 11/19/85
LFP for
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

the Court
draft 12j27j85
draft 12/30/85
draft 1/17/86
draft l/23/86
Joined by HAB 12/30/85
WJB 12/30/85
JPS l/17/86
TM l/21/86
WHR dissenting
1st draft l/15/86
2nd draft 2/11/86
3rd draft lj23j86
Joined by SOC 1/15/86
BRW 1/17/86

(Cabell)

January 27, 1986
MIDA SALLY-POW

lfp/ss
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84-801 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection
J7 This case comes to us

QR

writ-o£

of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

e~~i9~a~i

from the Court

It presents the question/~

whether a Trustee in Bankruptcy may use the ~~t power ¥'
provided by the Bankruptcy Code,~in cont~~n of state
environmental laws.
~IYI~

,
Peti~ione ~~/ouanta Resources; 'o perated facilities in New York
.A
I-AA..I- ~ ~~ /;ti'Xt <:: .
and New Jerse~hat had illegally accepted; 1tew::ic wast:.___? i ~.
t\

After New Jersey requested that the sites be cleaned up, Quanta
filed for bankruptcy.

-sought to abandon both the New Jersey and New York sites.

The Trustee - acting under S554 of the Bankruptcy Code ___..,

~

were no longer of value to the estate.

"

They

-rne tsanKruptcy Court approved the abandonments, ( and New
York and New Jersey filed separate appeals.
reversed both judgments.

~

111/e

The Court of Appeals

· ~ ~ -;,.~ ~

For the reasons stated in ~ opinio~, we find that in
s s' /f.
"'
enacting S554 in 1978, Congress did not intend to change

:1

-limitations~on

~ ~)

__,

the judicially developed doctrine of abandonment -

limitations that protect legitimate state and federal interests.
Such limitations on the abandonment powe; /also are consistent
with limitations upon other aspects of the Trustee's operations.
Moreover, Congress has repeatedly emphasize~in other

statutes~ts goal of protecting the environment against toxic
pollution.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST has filed a dissenting op1n1on, in which

~~···
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE O'CONNORA
joi ~ ~·

+

tc.f-~o r

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27- The Supreme Court ruled by 5 to 4 today that
trustees for 1bankrupt companies may
not abandon toxic waste dumps in disregard of state regulations "reasonably designed to protect the public's
health <Jr safety."
The decision suggests, somewhat
ambiguously, that the a~sets of the
bankrupt Quanta Resources Corpora•
tion must be used to pay for cleaning
up toxic wastes at its waste oil facilities at Long Island City in Queens and
Edgewater, N.J .
·
It is a victory of some national importance for state environmental
regulators and a defeat for creditors
of bankrupt companies such as Quanta, who will be able to satisfy their
claims only out of any assetrt left after
cleanup costs have been paid.
Dissent Cites Vagueness
The four dissenting Justices
stressed, however, that the majority's opinion was unclear as to
whether a bankruptcy 'tniStee must
do a total cleanup, or only remove the
most immediate hazards, before
abandoning a toxic waste facility.
The trustee for Quanta could be liable under today's ruling to reimburse New York City for about $2.5
million it spent to clean up the polychlorinated biphenals, or PCB's, that
the company left at the Long Island
City facility, and to clean up similar
wastes that are still present at the
Edgewater facility at a cost of more
than $6 million.
Quanta declared bankruptcy in 1981
while New Jersey officials were seeking to require it to clean up thousands
of gallons of oil and sludge containing
PCB's. It has total assets wor.th less
than $2 million, so today's ruling
could mean that nothing will be left
for banks and other creditors.
Attorney General Robert Abrams
of New York hailed what he called
"this major decision," saying it
showed that "a financi(i~ly pressed

Special to Tile ·New York Times

toxic waste company Wi
lowed to dump its toxic w
problems on the. public... '
The problem of compa
ing bankruptcy and seek
don toxic waste dumps "
up all over New York Sta
Riley, a spokesman for
said today.
Thomas J. O'Neill, the
trustee, · and Midlanti
Bank, Quanta's main cr
argued that using the ass
rupts to clean up their
dumps would have the un
leaving their creditors,
the public at large, suffer
sequences.
The Bankruptcy Refor
authorizes bankruptcy
general terms to abando
erty that is "burdensom
consequential value to th
contains . no explicit ex
toxic waste dumps or ot
mental hazards.
But Justice Lewis F.
majority opinion said th
implied exception in the l
a trustee's power to cont
health and safety regula
He affirmed a Feder
ruling that bankruptcy
erred in authorizing the
abandon the two sites.
Justice Powell noted th
sey officials had found
violated a prohibition in i
permit by accepting
400,000 gallons of oil c
with PCB's, a highly to
gen, and that more than 7
of toxic, PCB-contamina
been found "in deterio
leaky containers" at L
City.
After a bankruptcy co
York had authorized th
abandon the Long Island
Justice Powell said, "the
moved the 24-hour guard
shut down the fire-supp
tem," presenting an im

Court in Toxic-

COMPANY NEWS

D4
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(?1./~~0/-St>a-

M!Dl SALLY-POW

authority to abandon property conferred upon the trustee

~
~

5 rQtt-Et:)
must be read in the context of the Bankruptcy Code ~f 1 91 ~

11.4. in its entirety. t{)(ection

aL-uJ
5~ ) { must

be considered

in light of the pre-1978 abandonment power of
a bankruptcy trustee, a power viewed as subject to common
law restrictions on its exercise.

When thus viewed in

context, and in light of long prevailing understanding and
practice prior to

~ ·t9f3

of §554 (a) ottt -o£

·~ uld

not be tolerated.

CCC llj24j85

The Court today construes 11

u.s.c.

§554(a) 1 of

the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to permit a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property that is burdensome or
of inconsequential value to the estate without regard
to "any general requirement of compliance with state
regulatory laws."

Ante, at

The Court recognizes

only a narrow restriction on this abandonment power,
such as "where abandonment by the trustee might itself
create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be
miquely able to guard against."

Ante, at

I

believe, however, that the meaning of §554 must be
determined in the light of the restricted pre-1978
abandonment power of the bankruptcy trustee and in the
context of the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code
provisions.

f

•

Upon such review, it is clear that Con-

11/24/85; 12:04 PM

DRAFT

gress did not intend the interpretation of §554(a)
adopted by the Court today.

'

..

·,

I

page 2.

CCC

11/25/85

In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the
risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substnces, I am unwilling to presume
that by its enactment of §554(a), Congress implicitly
overturned long-standing restrictions on the commonlaw abandonment power.

IV
Today's holding allows the trustees of these
bankrupt estates to abandon hazardous materials and to
aggravate already-existing dangers by halting security
measures that prevent public entry, valdalism, and
fire.l

Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 12,

~H«- c~f-s ~J ~.J ~ .-u..di-J~ ~~ ~

26.~ The trustees are ~t required to take even rela-

tively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as
security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents
not on a school stove. 2

Because I believe that Con-

llj25j85; 11:21 AM

gress did not grant trustess

DRAFT

~~
~

unlmited license to

abandon property of the bankrupt estate, I dissent .

......

page 2.

CCC

llj25j85

lJoint Appendix before the Court of Appeals
11-12 (affidavit of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.).

The

trustees in this case have abandoned 470,000 gallons
of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks
of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies,
destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic
damge, or death through personal contact.

"'

Brief for

A

United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23.

See Joint Ap-

pendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York
site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7
(400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Join Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service);
id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of

11/25/85; 11:21 AM

DRAFT

adjacent areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure
to PCBs and their derivatives).

2 Both abandonment orders, now affirmed by the
Court, were without qualification.

The EPA urged the

pre-abandonment steps outlined in the text as part of
its Region II Action Memorandum (Jan. 25, 1985)
(lodged with the Court).

page 2.
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NOTES.

1 see, ~, Hillsdale Foundry Co v. Michigan, a
--------------~

B. R. 195 (W. D.Mich. 197 4)

(action by Michigan Attorney

General to enforce state's anti-pollution laws held
subject to automatic stay) •

The House

\.~eu.'o\i~ d\'!.c:.....,,~ )

Repor~erred
:t~ref,

I
also to an w nreported cas ~ from Texa ~where a stay
)

prevented the state of Maine from closing

1

~hat

~debtor's

was polluting a river in violation of the

state's environmntal protection laws.

H.R. Rep. No. 595,

95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174-175.

2congress eliminated the small generator

a~~~

exception and subjected maHy m&re facilities to the
""\

2.

regulations.

Pub.L.No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248-3272

(codified at 42
r--~

u.s.c.

§300l(d)).

Another provision

broadens the Act's coverage by automatically

~

u

assigning a hazardous rating to s g{stances that the EPA
"'(

does not classify by a set deadline.
3227-31 (codified at 42
(g)(6)).

u.s.c.

Id., 98 Stat. at

§§3004(d),

Amended enforcement provi ~a

(e),

(f) (3),

ow more

- - - - - - - - -·- -·---

- -------- ·---

id., 98 Stat. at 3271-72 (codified at
--

orders or

suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has
98 Stat. at 3257-3258 (codi£ied at 42

2

15.

security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents
(presumably not on a school stove).

Because 1 believe

~~

~~

that Congress did not ~ow the trustee -~~eat a license
1"\
~
A.
in

~SS4'~

abandonment power, 1 dissent.

I

{

/

I

I

c
'-...._

It is so ordered.

'"'"-:..~
'
.
'

.
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M1Dl SALLY-POW
§544(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978(?) 1 authorizes a
trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property that is
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate in
contravention of state laws or regulations that are
reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety?

Note to Cabell:
1 suggest reframing the first sentence as
indicated above, and then omit the remainder of what is
now in the first paragraph of the opinion.

As you may

have noted from my prior decisions in past year, 1 prefer

2.

simply to state the question accurately in a sentence or
two at the beginning of an opinion, and wait until after
the facts and holdings of the courts below have been
stated before expressing the conclusion of the Court.
And, Cabell, your statement of the facts in Part
1 - particularly pages two and three require rewriting
somewhat more coherently.

As presently drafted, I think

the reader may be in the dark as to exactly what had
happened.

1 have not reread Parts II and Ill, as I assume

that they are in substance what has been approved by four
Justices of the Court.

If there are changes of substance,

please identify them for me.
I have suggested some changes in Part IV.
have questions, do not hesitate to ask me.

If you

lfp/ss 12/26/85
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M!Dl SALLY-POW
§544(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978(?) 1 authorizes a
trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property that is
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate in

~

contravention of statek laws or regulations that are
reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety®

Note to Cabell:
1 suggest reframing the first sentence as
indicated above, and then omit the remainder of what is
now in the first paragraph of the opinion.

As you may

have noted from my prior decisions in past year, I prefer

2.

simply to state the question accurately in a sentence or
two at the beginning of an opinion, and wait until after
the facts and holdings of the courts below have been
stated before expressing the conclusion of the Court.
And, Cabell, your statement of the facts in Part
I - particularly pages two and three require rewriting
somewhat more coherently.

As presently drafted, I think

the reader may be in the dark as to exactly what had
happened.

I have not reread Parts II and III, as I assume

that they are in substance what has been approved by four
Justices of the Court.

If there are changes of substance,

please identify them for me.
I have suggested some changes in Part IV.
have questions, do not hesitate to ask me.

If you

PERNIK

CARTER-POW

January 14, 1986: 6:38 PM

Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code- and therefore
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all
state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trust-

state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.

'·

/

Cabell
x3073
3rd draft
3 copies
see also: RUNBUM
4$080lg

PERNIK

CARTER-POW

January 14, 1986; 6:38 PM

Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code- and therefore
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all
state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.

r')1t..~<tla·l t . ,.~~
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abell
. ~·'
x3073
3rd draft
3 copies
see also: PERNIK
4$080lg

RUMBUN

CARTER-POW

January 14,

1986~

lt.=t

;_;;r;"l ll>t.

vft{¥l~ ~ /J /1 / Z,

6:37 PM

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state and local laws.
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety.

According-

ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws
imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention

of

a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to
protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.YuAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

January 15, 1986

84-801 Midlantic
Rider A, p. 12

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted
pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state and local laws.
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety.

According-

ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws
imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention

of

a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to
protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.ll Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

January 15, 1986

84-801 Midlantic
Rider A, p. 10

Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code -and therefore
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all
state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.
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Cabell
x3073
3rd draft
3 copies
see also: RUNBUM
TEKAMD
4$080lg
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Even
under

January 16, 1986: 11:12 AM

CARTER-POW
though

§959 (b)

§554 (a)

delimit

of

the

does

not directly

Bankruptcy Code

apply
-

and

to

an

abandonment

therefore does not

the precise conditions on an abandonment -

the section

nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend
for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws that otherwise
constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.

Cabell
x3073
3rd draft
3 copies
see also: PERNIK
TEKAMD
4$080lg

~

CARTER-POW

January 16, 1986; 11:12 AM

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bankruptcy
Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not intend for
§554(a) to preempt all state and local laws.

The Bankruptcy

Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment without
formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's
health and safety.

Accordingly, without reaching the question

whether certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may
be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication
itself, we hold that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards.l1/ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.

'•

CCC

01/16/86

Cabell
x3073
3rd draft
3 copies
see also: RUNBUM
PERNIK
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CARTER-POW
Technical

January 16, 1986; 11:00 AM

amendments

in

the

Bankruptcy

Amendments

and

Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after
"value" in §554(a).
380 (1984).

Pub.L.

98-353,

Tit.

III,

§468(a),

98 Stat.

J).~
--...

- p~,NT&O

?

\Of1.0
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of a
school," he may abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic
and carcinogic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating
containers where they present risks of explosion, fire,
contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through

'5~

GcNtuAo

~, ~ 4, 2!..

personal contact. A more modest reading of the trustee's
I'

~

c/

-a.-~'
t;

~ ~~

~}-~
p_. ~

j

,

~

.

~~

/

~~

£11'-

,,.

abandonment power under §SS t~voids this unsupported

~
~~·
~~

distinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the ,~
\t~J
~

~r~
~
of

{_~ ~

(!'/

~~~~~-o ~r._,~_.J..r
..,.-~

" u. .~.c.

~~·~ 'tJ"P~"' abandonment
~-~~

~~~~
lff:"_r_ ~r ri ~

1

power, and accords with the test r 1cteQJ scope

[ . . - - - - - - - -. ---)

:"\

other provisions ~ithin t:fi~ \Bankruptcy Code_; and with

the repeatedly expressed congressional interest in
environmental protection.

Accordingly, I dissent.
I

~~~..+~~
?.,n..t..~~
~

power before the 1978

-

4-

revisions ~ the Bankruptcy Code was ~iearly limited by a

"
public interest

excepti~n A~tainly

no case approached

~

~

the sweep of the abandonment power that the major±ty
bestows upon a trustee today.
?
l '

•

We should presume that
'\

Congress incorporated these common-law restrictions on the

.---;::::::;

power.

I

'

J
In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,

198 F.2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded

~

c~~ ~~ ~.c:::..~...,.~L.....; ... p
~ht ~5&.~(9~4-f-~

)

~~-~--~t~~~
JI-~t.-2... <:A..-1~ 1~~~~~~ vt.

3.

that a bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a
barge company, could not abandon several barges when the
abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in
violation of federal law.

re Chicago

Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (CA 7), cert. denied, 317

u.s.

683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held that a debtor

transit company could not abandon its lease of a branch
railway line when local law required continued operation.

\.SVmJ.~.)
(Fina ~l; in ln re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B.R. 277 (Bankr.
E.o.Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its equitable

L6'1
power to "safeguard the public interest" @no

~.

~

l

debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines
~

before abandoning them.

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
~~

Thus, when Congress enacted §554 ~ i~ did A~t

~

~

ln codifying the judicially-

4.

tCo-:ce=~)

.b;::LJ:j~
r~f

developed

~sumably

abandonment,

~

the established

cor~ry

that a

included

\eo.J.A ~J
trustee @an~o!) exercise

his abandonment power in violation of certain state and
federal laws.

The normal rule of statutory construction

is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes
~at

intent specific.

Transatlantique, 443

Edmonds v. Compagnie General

u.s.

256, 266-267 (1979).

(More~

@' e Court· has followed this rule with particular care in
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.

~

.

~

If

t5!/!!!J!P

Congress wishes to grant the trustee anW extraordinary
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be
clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred
from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt."

t

Stewarts v.

5.

Hammer, 194

u.s.

441, 444 (1904); see Palmer v.

Massachusetts, 308

u.s.

79, 85 (1939)

("If this old and

familiar power of the states [over local railorad service]
was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts
bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change.").
11

Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted
a trustee

equal to

bankruptcY.

the abandonment power that the majority confers today.
fact, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative
determination that the trustee is not to have carte
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law.A Where the
Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the
trustee and where there was no common law limitation on

,.,

.:. '

.._

In

6.

that power, Congress has expressly provided that the
efforts of the trustee to marshall and distribute the
assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest

~te ~

~~~~
in public health and safety.

~

vL4
1

Congress, having placed

·

belie~e

~ limitation~upon

r-------~--L-h-\Mo.-ke~ I J

Jl...

(t:,..""'t"U"'"'s""'t'l ':'~e":::"
":o:" s--::-lo;:::n)"C" r

1 .cannot

thet A
0

pankruptcYr

L4'!.J~."'.JJ

er aspects of @ e 'il:) operations 'A me-ant

.

~~

to overrule a well-establlshed judicial restriction on the
1\

abandonment power.

As we held last Term in the context of

the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-inpossession is not relieved of all obligations under the
Act simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy."
Bildisco & Bildisco,
The automatic

u.s.

__,

NLRB v.

.

~

stay ~of

the Bankruptcy Code,

K
§362(a), has been described as "one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."

-

s.

7.

Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50? (1978); H.R. Rep.

No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340
importance of §362(a)

in preserving

the

debtor, Congress has enacted several

health and safety:

~
I

"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection,
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or
attempting to fix damages for violation of such
a law the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H.R. Rep. No. 595,
supra, at 343 (1977); s. Rep. No. 989, supra, at

52.

8.

Petitioners have suggested that the

existence of

~ express

exception

~lg~~omatic
~l

stay; - -

undermines the inference of a similar exception
abandonment power:
restr ictf

the

Had Congress sought to

h-; scope of §554, it would have enacted :rimilar /

limiting provisions.

This argument, however, fails to

acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of
§§554 and 362.

As

~I

have noted, the exceptions

~t

\ he

judicially-created abandonment power were firmly
established.

But in enacting §362 in 1978, Congress

significantly expanded the scope of the automatic stay,
see 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §20.03, at 5-6
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier

with

the[fi~adoption

of the Bankrutpcy Rules in

1973~
0

~ nd that had substantially broadened the import of th e:J-

9.

automatic stay by 1978, see id. §20.02, at 4-5.
face of the greatly increased reach of

1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded
automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce
their antipollution laws,l and Congress wanted to overrule

th~e

interpretations in its 1978 revision.

See H.R. Rep.

595, supra, at 174-175.
Section 959(b) provides additional evidence that

~

Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose

of rehabilitating the debtor or distributing the assets of

.;r ffiands~btor

the estate to abrogate all state laws.

~n §9591tr;~e

in possession to •manage and operate

the property in his possession •.• according to the
requirement of the valid laws of the State."

The

10.

petitioners have contended that §959(b)

is relevant only

when the trustee is actually operating the business of the
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.

~

The majo5i ty

declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states

\t't-

simply

J

e trustee's filing of a petition to abandon does

not constitute 'manage[ment] • or 'operat[ion]. '"
respect, .lr=

bel

i

e~ch

I GQlieve

With all

a formulation begs the question.

0~~

~t ~959(b)
/{

applies when the trustee

is liquidating the business of a debtor because that
interpretation gives
"operate."

both the words "manage" and

Courts "are obliged to give effect, if

possible, to every word Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442

u.s.

330, 339 (1979), and §959 (b), on its face,

encompasses something more than "operation."

As the Court

of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase

11.

"'manage[ment] • of the 'property,'" could not, in the
abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation.

A See

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, ___

u.s.

___,

at ___ (stating, after surveying the trustee's

various powers, that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the
trusteee wide-ranging managment authority over the
~

"L

,

debtor").

~
1'\

reading is also consistent with the

section's legislative history,

~ shows

the provision

L_9E.EI\d J
was l to place railroad receiverships within the reach of
state law.

Sees. Misc. Doc. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1888); s. Misc. Doc. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.
Misc. Doc. 19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess.
Doc. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.
§959(b)

(1887); s.

(1886); H.R. Misc.

(1886).

The precept of

is clear: "[T]he goals of the federal bankruptcy

f

.. '

12.

laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not
authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements
for the operation of the business, even if the continued
operation of the business would be thwarted by applying
state laws."

739 F.2d at 919.
Ill

Finally, I am reluctant to

1\

~a

legislative

intent to confer unrestricted abandonment power upon a

~~A
trustee in bankruptcy when Congress has repeatedly

~n

;"'\

~ its

II
~ Lf1
·~~ goal of protecting the env~Lrmental

1\

v ::Chemical

against toxic pollution.

Manfctures Association

v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

u.s.

__, at

~
Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and
1\

Recovery Act (RCRA), 42

u.s.c.

§§6901-6987, to regulate

the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous

was~~lby

13.

monitoring wastes from their creation until after their

permanent disposal.

That Act

"J"" ~Clli~~~~ I
mPd we2

the United

States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of
~

activities involving hazardous wastes that "may presnt an
A

imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment."

42

u.s.c.

§6973; see also

98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983).

s.

Rep. 98-284,

Congress - snJ: sr

31! 1 •

rll;

broadened the scope of the statute and tightened the
regulatory restraints in 1984. 2

In the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(the "Superfund" Act) ' /\Congress established a fund to
finance cleanup of some sites and

require ~

reimburse either the fund or the
parties

for

the cleanup.

The

Su r fund Act also empowers the federal government to

0

•

..A

14.

secure such relief as may be necessary to avert

~

"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance."

u.s.c.

§9606.

42

In the face of Congress' undisputed concern

over the c~l risks of the improper storage and
disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling
to presume that Congress implicitly overruled longstanding restrictions on the common-law abandonment power.

IV
Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon

an;~~gravate

hazardous materials

already-existing dangers

by stopping security measures that prevented
vandalism, and fire.

even minor steps to

.-

.'

7
.
public

entry,

The trustee is not required to take

~mminent

danger, such as

·ll!! A

NOV 201
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

The majority today rules that although a trustee
may not "abandon dynamite on a stove in the basement of a
school," he may abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic
and carcinogic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating
containers where they present risks of explosion, fire,
contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through
personal contact.

A more modest reading of the trustee's

2.

abandonment power under S554 avoids this unsupported
distinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the
abandonment power, and accords with the restricted scope
of other provisions within the Bankruptcy Code and with
the repeatedly expressed congressional interest in
environmental protection.

Accordingly, 1 dissent.
1

The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code was clearly limited by a
public interest exception.

Certainly no case approached

the sweep of the abandonment power that the majority
bestows upon a trustee today.

We should presume that

Congress incorporated these common-law restrictions on the
trustee's abandonment power.
/

/

In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,

198 F.2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded

3.

that a bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a
barge company, could not abandon several barges when the
abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in
violation of federal law.

Similarly, in In re Chicago
I

Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (CA ' 7), cert. denied, 317

u.s.

/.

I

683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held that a debtor

transit company could not abandon its lease of a branch
railway line when local law required continued operation.
Finally, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1

~JN,)

0

277 ([Bank Q

,r

~ De Pa.

1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its equitable

1'

susnu
MAitllAl

power to "safeguard the public interest" and require

§ /.~.I

debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines
before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted §554, it did not
write upon a tabula rasa.

In codifying the judicially-

su STYU

I

l <i.'?

j

MAI!Al

..v .
(~et.) l

4.

developed rule of abandonment, it also presumably included
the established corfll~ry that a trustee cannot exercise
his abandonment power in violation of certain state and
federal laws.

The normal rule of statutory construction

is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes
that intent specific.
Transatlantique, 443

\

Edmonds v. Compagnie General £
T\

u.s.

I

.I

I

256, 266-267 (1979).

Moreover,

the Court has followed this rule with particular care in
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.

If

Congress wishes to grant the trustee any extraordinary
/

exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be
clearly expre.9sed, not left to be collected or inferred
from disputable considerations of conveni~nce in
/

administering the estate of the bankrupt."

S~arts v.

!

I
l

(§( '
~~;.

I

s.

Hammer, 194

u.s.

441, 444 (1904); see Palmer

Massachusetts, 308

u.s.

r

r

79, 85 (1939)

~.

I

("If this old and

familiar power of the states [over local

rai ~d

service]

was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts
bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
I

language fitting for so drastic a changee ").
II
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted
a trustee in bankruptcy power in any other area equal to
the abandonment power that the majority confers today.
fact, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative
determination that the trustee is not to have carte
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law.

Where the

Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the
trustee and where there was no common law limitation on

In

~

6.

that power, Congress has expressly provided that the
efforts of the trustee to marshal/ and distribute the
assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest
in public health and safety.

1 cannot believe that

Congress, having placed these limitations upon bankruptcy
trustees in many other aspects of their operations, meant
to overrule a well-established judicial restriction on the
abandonment power.

8

As we held last

in the context of

I

the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-inpossession is not relieved of all obligations under the
,

/

AActA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy."
Bildisco

&

Bildisco, -A-

NLRB v.

u.s. -IT:-' -It-"

The automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code,
(

§362(a}, has been described as "one of the fundamental
/

debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."

s.

7.

Itt STYl(
-~l

--

' '3' j&
;_/

9!i;tJr-· 54

I

Rep.

95-/i::) {J.J

No. ~989, ~ 5th

I

Conq., 2d Sess. 50?) (1978); H.R. Rep.
'

No.~595,

5th-cong., 1st Ses ~ 340 (1977).
\

Despite the

importance of §362(a) in preserving the estate of the
debtor, Congress has enacted several classes of exceptions
to the stay that allow the government to comment or
continue legal proceedings.

I

Section 362(b) (5) permits the

enforcement of judgments or to enforce "non-monetary"
judgments.

The legislative history makes clear that one

of the purposes of this exception was to protect public
health and safety:
\

s/

~I

"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection,
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or
attempting to fix damages for violation of such
a lawA the action ?r proc~eding is not stayed
under the automat1c stay." H.R. Rep. No. A595,
supra, at ' 343 ~1!77) ; s. Rep. No. A989, supra, at
52 ~
:.:

·..

8.

Petitioners have suggested that the
existence of this express exception for automatic stays
undermines the inference of a similar exception for the
abandonment power:

Had Congress sought to similarly

restrict the scope of §554, it would have enacted similar
limiting provisions.

This argument, however, fails to

acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of
§§5S4 and 362.

As we have noted, the exceptions for the

judicially-created abandonment power were firmly

ntUYU

established.

But in enacting §362 in 1978, Congress

MAIIAL

i 3.~
~

~· ®MJ#/®/@/

significantly expanded the scope of the automatic stay,

1"

see

N

/

(1981}, a process that had begun only five years earlier
with the first adoption of the Bankr ~y Rules in 1973
and that had substantially broadened the import of the

Ff·/

9.

)I

automatic stay by 1978, see id. A S20 : 02, at

4~5.

In the

face of the greatly increased reach of S362, Congress had
to expressly establish limits to this new power.

Between

1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded
automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce
their antipollution laws,l and Congress wanted to overrule
these interpretations in its 1978 revision.

Yf-o. q5f;:
TA

zg u.

I

'S.c.~ j

See H.R. Rep.

I

1\ 595, supra, at 174-175.
~ctio!D 959(b) provides additional evidence that

Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose
of rehabilitating the debtor or distributing the assets of
/

the estate to abrogate all state laws.

ln §959(b), the
/

Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate
the property in his possession

according to the
/

requiremen ~

of the valid laws of the State."

The

10.

petitioners have contended that S959(b)

is relevant only

when the trustee is actually operating the business of the
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.

The majority

declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states
simply "the trustee's filing of a petition to abandon does
not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion] .'"

With all

respect, 1 believe such a formulation begs the question.
1 believe that S959(b) applies when the trustee
is liquidating the business of a debtor because that
interpretation gives effect to both the words "manage" and
/

"operate."

Courts "are obliged to give effect, if
/

'

possible, to every word Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442

u.s.

r

/

330, 339 (1979), and §959 (b), on its face,

encompasses something more than "operation."

As the Court

of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase

11.

"'manage[ment) • of the 'property,'" could not, in the
abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation.

See

Commodity Futures Trading Comm( ssioi9 v. Weintraub, ~

u.s.

~

~ -- ~~.

(stating, after surveying the trustee's
I

various powers, that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the
trusteee wide-ranging managJfent authority over the
I

debtor").

The reading is also consistent with the

section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was to place railroad receiverships within the reach of
state law.

k. /

SeeS. Misc. Ooc. A44, 50th Cong. ; 1st Sess.

'rk.j

(1888); S. Misc. Doc. A7' 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887);

~.;

Misc. Doc. /\ 19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H.R. Misc.

/

/

/

,
Doc. 1\ 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. ( 1886} •
/

I

s.

,

The precept of

§959(b) is clear: "[T)he goals of the federal bankruptcy

12.

laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not
authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements
for the operation of the business, even if the continued
operation of the business would be thwarted by applying
state laws. ~.

739 F. 2d

@ 919 ~
Ill

Finally, 1 am reluctant to divine a legislative
intent to confer unrestricted abandonment power upon a
trustee in bankruptcy when Congress has repeatedly shown
its § :foremost goal of protecting the env ffln ment@
against toxic pollu,tion.l\ Chemical Man@ tures Ass§f iation)

v.

Natural Resources Defense Council,!\
I

(1985).

+

u.s. __, @ __ Lf?D/~ 1

Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and

Recovery' Act (RCRA), 42

u.s.c.

§§6901...:6987, to regulate ·

the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste by

{.

13.

monitoring wastes from their creation until after their
permanent disposal.

That Act also empowers the United

States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of
I

activities involving hazardous wastes that "may

pre~nt

an

imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
I'

environment."

P·/

42

c? ath Cong., 1st

u.s.c. S6973:

Sess~ sa {19S3).

see also

s.

I

Rep. ~ 98-284,

Congress substantially

broadened the scope of the statute and tightened the
regulatory restraints in 1984. 2

In the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
{the "Superfund" Act), Congress established a fund to
finance cleanup of some sites and require certain
responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the
parties responsible for financing the cleanup.

d ICJ!:, I'!'/~u~fund Act
A

~

The

also empowers the j ede r a 1 lover nmen t to

1'1'

SU STYLl
MANUAL
§ 5, "J.-.

14.

secure such relief as may be necessary to avert an
I

"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual
I

or threatened release of a hazardous substance."

u.s.c.

\

§9606.

42

In the face of Congress' undisputed concern

over the critical risks of the improper storage and
disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling
to presume that Congress implicitly overruled longstanding restrictions on the common-law abandonment power.
IV

Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon
hazardous materials and aggravate already-existing dangers
by stopping security measures that prevented public entry,
vandalism, and fire.

The trustee is not required to take

even minor steps to lessen imminent danger, such as

15.

security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents
(presumably not on a school stove).

Because 1 believe

that Congress did not allow the trustee so great a license
in §554's abandonment power, 1 dissent.

NOV 20 1985 ·ll!!! AM
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Sll STH:
IAIKIAL

lsee,

1Bcoj8~a.j&J~/@ 195

~,

Hillsdale Foundry

Co~~_ v. Michigan~
a #Ad·
~)

/

~g De>Mich.

1974)

(action by Michigan Attorney

General to enforce ~tate's anti-pollution laws held
subject to automatic stay) •

The House Report referred

also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the ftate of Maine from closing down a debtor's

r

D>

f~ ;

~e/
tf>· / (!911 ) 0

j

~ant

that was polluting a river in violation of the

state's environmRtal protection laws.
~ 5th

Cong., 1st

Ses ~

i

ill?.. _, :

NOTES.

~

Q)

.I

H.R. Rep.

No. ~595,

174-175£)

2congress eliminated the small generator
exception and subjected many more facilities to the

.

'

I

I

j

2.

regulations.

~I

Pub.L.~

I

98-6161 98 Stat. 32211 3248-3272

u.s.c.l\ s@<d~).

(codified at 42

Another provision

automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically
assigning a hazardous rating to ~tances that the EPA
does not classify by a set deadline.

3~:JA.)~Ci~'l:)

3227-;tl (codified at 42

(~. JCfrt~)/

(g)

!1),/1/),/3).:/
A)to913 (~. ,qg)

(6~).

U. s.c '1\

u.s.c." ss@(d)

98 Stat. @
I

(e)

I

(f) (3)

s~@l ,

98 Stat. @

3271-;(_2 (codified at 42

and authorize administrative orders or

,
suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has

M.,Jf~J;/

A/ ~g19~ / (~,,qgs)/

~

occurred.

u. s.c "A

I

Amended enforcement provisions allow more

citizen suits, @

I

®

98 Stat. @

s~o@<h!,l·

3

3257_:3258 (codified at 42

\
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JUSTICE POWELL, disse mg:-- t
~
rl I 4 1 g )
The Court today, les that a trustee in bankruptcy may
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential
value to the estate without regard to "any general requirement of compliance with state regulatory laws. " Supra, at
-zr-· ~s only a "narrow[] condition on the abandonment CddA - ~
pwer ... such as where abandonment by the trustee might
~~ ~
if'self create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be
/2(....o ~
uniquely able to guard against." Supra, at - - . Under
~ ~.
the Court's holding, although a trustee may not "abandon dynamite on a stove in the basement of a school," ibid.,,Jlle may ~ U..
' abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogic waste
' .
----r;
oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers where they
tJ present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup~ plies, destruction 6f natural resourees, and~mjm y:; genetic - ~~
~ damage, ar death- thraugh J3orsonal oontset, see Brief for
~

Q

J

~
~ruted States;

() ~~ ~~ _)
~~

Ami= Curiae,

4,~~e:: ~

v

84-801 & 84-805---DISSENT
2

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

reading of the trustee's abandonment power under
U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 avoids this unsupported dit;;tinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the abandonment
power, and accords with the limited scope of other Bankruptcy ~ode ~rovision.s, ~EH.,._·~-eiil8-'fle.J;>efl~;U¥-e::rcm:-essecn--.

The trustee's abandonment po er before the 197
sions of the Bankruptcy Code )Wk£H~~JUitiiU~~-{:1~f)ii'"'
W-MJ
~. ; T~s w~ made clear by tee
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198''F.
289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. Tfie Court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.

-

In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
a debtor transit company could not cease its operation of
a branch railway line when local law required continued operation. While the court did not forbid the trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an unexpired lease), it
conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with
' Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may~andon any property of the
estate that is burdensome to estate or that is o nconsequential value to the
estate."
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state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. R. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").
II

Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a
trustee in bankruptcy ~ther power equal to the abandonment power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I
show below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the trustee

-D
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and where there was no common law li1n~on on that
power, Congress has expressly provided~t~the efforts of
the trustee to marshafa~e assets of the estate
must yield to governmental interest in public health and
- - --aafetn One cannot assume that Congress, having placed
these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations,
intended to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on
the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context
of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply
by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
2
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the
government to commence or continue legal proceedings.
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the government to
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate.
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception was to protect public health and
safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." 1\ H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343; S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 52.
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: Had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly
expanded the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §20.03, p. 5-6
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier with
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id.,
§ 20.02, at 4-5. In the face of the greatly increased reach of
§ 362, it was necessary for Congress to establish express lim(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.

?
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its to this new power. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts
had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose
State's efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 3 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 reVISion. See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175.
Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 provides additional evidence that
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code'~
tQJlaPagate all state laws. In § 959(b), the Code commands
debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in
his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State." The petitioners have contended that
§ 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating
it. The Court declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a petition to
abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion]."'
With all respect, such a formulation begs the question.
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979),
3

See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
• Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."

~- lr
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and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase '"manage[ment]' of the 'property,"' could
not, in the abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471U. S. - - , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging
management authority over the debtor"). This reading is
also consistent with the section's legislative history, ~ ~..f
shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc.
No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7,
50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1886). The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted
by applying state laws." In re Quanta Resources Group,
739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3 1984).

III
Finally, I am reluctant to find a legislative intent to confer
unrestricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bankruptcy when Congress ha.s repeatedly emphasized its "goal of
protecting the environmental against toxic pollution."
Chemical Manfufactures Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 470 U.S.--,-- (1985). Congress has
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after their permanent
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek ju-
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dicial or administrative restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 5 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
Pub.L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and require certain responsible
parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid
for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health
or welfare or the environment because of an actual or thre ened release of a hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 06.
In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the r · ks of
the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and t ic substances, I am unwilling to presume that ongres 1mphcit y
long-standing restrictions on the ommon-law
abandonment power.

Hl.V

5

Today's holding allows WB trusteej ie aba~don hazardous
materials and to aggravat e already-existing dangers by~
~ .ping security measures that preventj!!:t public ent~~tl~~l~
ism, and fire. . The truste[ ~not -reqllired to take eve~mmor
steps to red e imminenCe~ such as security fencing,
5

Congr
ehminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more f tlities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248- 72 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
prov:·sion automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assi ·ng a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a , et deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
( 0, (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
ore citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
Supp. 1985)), and authorize
· istl'ativ
or suits to compel "coreak has occurred. 98 Stat. 57-3258 (codified at
ective action" af
U. ~ . § 6928(h~ (Supp. 1985)).
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drainage and diking repairs, sealing deterior~~
ting
removal of explosive agents not on a school sto e.
believe that Congress did not grant.t¥ truste a
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today rules that a trustee in bankruptcy may
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential
value to the estate without regard to "any general requirement of compliance with state regulatory laws. (Supra~~ at
- - . This is only a "narr~ condition on the abandonment
r . . . such as where abandonment by the trustee might
itself create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be
uniquely able to guard against." ~ at - - . Under ) I
the Court's holding, although a trustee may not "abandon dynamite on a stove in the basement of a school," ibi<() he may \ J
abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogic waste
oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers where they
present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic
damage, or death through personal contact, see Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23. A more modest
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reading of the trustee's abandonment power under 11
U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 avoids this unsupported distinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the abandonment
power, and accords with the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions and with the repeatedly expressed
congressional interest in environmental protection. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code was clearly limited by a public
interest exception. This was made clear by the only relevant cases. In Ottenheimer ~.Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 2~9 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. , The Court stated:
"The judge-ma~e [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner ,of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.

I

In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that a debtor transit company could not cease its operation of
a branch railway line when local law required continued operation. While the court did not forbid the trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an unexpired lease), it
conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with
' Section 554(a) reads:
" "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the
estate t):lat is burdensopte to,fstate or that is ofinconsequential value to the
estate."
"·

J
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state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 ~· R. D]
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 25p, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be ·collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").
II

Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a
trustee in bankruptcy any other power equal to the abandonment power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I
show below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the trustee
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and where there was no common law limitation on that
power, Congress has expressly provided that the efforts of
the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate
must yield to governmental interest in public health and
safety. One cannot assume that Congress, having placed
these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations,
intended to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on
the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context
of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply
by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamentat

~I
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Section 362(a) provides:
\
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this tiile, or an application filed under sec- j
tion fj(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. I
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of,~~,.(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of proc:ess, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recov.er a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
A(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commenc~ment of the case under
this title;
A(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
I\ (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any li~n against property of the
estate;
N 5) any act to create, perf~ct, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
t\(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
t\(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.against any claim against the debtor; 1
Md
.
~a)
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the ~estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the
,government to commence or continue legal proceedings.
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the iovernment to
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate.
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception was to protect public health and
safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law~he action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343.; S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 52.

q-/

Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: Had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, howSEE STYlt
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predeMANU~
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to
§::3. ~ _
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly estabfJ'
lished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly
ex_panded the scope of the automatic sta see 1,. NQRTONJA ~· \6 j
~NKRUPTCY) Lf\W ANI» p ACTICE § 20.03, PD5-6 ::;fJO
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier with
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id.,
§ 20.02, at 4-5. In the face of the greatly increased reach of
§ 362, it was necessary for Congress to establish express lim-
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; ..(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 1\,
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its to this new power. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts
had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose
State's efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 3 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 reVISIOn. See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175.
Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 provides additional evidence that
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose
to abrogate all state laws. In § 959(b), the Code commands
debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in
his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State." The petitioners have contended that
§ 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating
it. The Court declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a petition to
abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or6bperat[ion].'"
With all respect, such a formulation begs the question.
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every w_9rd Congr.7ss
used," Reiter { Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979),

@/

3
See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No; 95-595, p. 174-175.
• Section 959(b) provides:
I
" "Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a truste.e, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such truste~, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner. that the owner or posse~sor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof. ,r-
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and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could
not, in the abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471,tJ. S. - - , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging
management authority over the debtor"). This reading is
also consistent with the section's legislative history, which
shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc.
No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7,
50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1886). The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted
by applying state laws." In re Quanta Resources Group,
739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3 1984).

III
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Finally, I am reluctant to find a legislative intent to confer
unrestricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bankruptcy when Congress has repeatedly emphasized its "goal of
protecting the environment.@D against toxic pollution."
Chemical Mari_ufacturet!....Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,"470 U. :s. --, - - (1985). Congress has
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after their permanent
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek ju-
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dicial or administrative restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 5 In the Comprehensive
Environmental RespOJ!Se, Compensation, and Liability Act, 11
Pub.L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finanek cleanup of some sites and require certain responsible
parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid
for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health
or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606.
In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of
the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling to presume that Congress implicitly
overruled long-standing restrictions on the common-law
abandonment power.
IV
Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon hazardous
materials and to aggravate already-existing dangers by stopping security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. The trustee is not required to take even minor
steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing,
Congress eliminated the ·small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. )... 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify, by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after I} leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
5

,M...

~d.L ~

7

/
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drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and
removal of explosive agents not on a school stove. Because I
believe that Congress did not grant the trustee an unlimited
license in the abandonment power, I dissent.

lfp/ss 11/23/85

M1DCC SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

Cabell

'ID:

DATE:

November 23, 1985

Lewis .F. Powell, Jr .

.FROM:

84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic National Bank
The purpose of this memo is to make comments as
they occur to me when reading your Chambers Draft of our
dissent.
1.

What we say is likely to evoke a strong

response from Justice Rehnquist.
accurate in every respect.

~~~}3/

Therefore it must be

1 suggest that in the

~t we ~ tate more of the facts.

text~~

1 would take them

1\

l1u:z_,
from~court

opinions rather than the SG's brief where

~~·
~e.

My understanding is that the trustee in the New

York case

creditors that he wotlbd abandon the

•.

..

~

2.

Long Island site that includes 70,000 gallons of waste oil
contaminated by PCB.

1 believe - but have not checked -

~~

~

that )Y simila~ r~ st has been ~ e by the trustee with
respect to the Edgewater site in New Jersey where the SG's
brief states that 400,000 of waste oil
contaminated.

are ~

1 would put this in the text with reference

to the opinions of the two courts.

Then, in a footnote 1

think you could very well use your favorite quote from p.
23 of the SG's brief.

1 would commence the footnote along

the following lines:
"According to the b ( : f for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, the r~ rresponsible abandonment of
inherently hazardous wastes [requested by the
trustees] poses particularly alarming health and
safety concerns.
Hazardous wastes, by their
very nature, present risks . . • •.
(Here,
Cabell, finish the sentence as you now have it
and putting it in quotes.
Since it is taken
from the SG's brief 1 would then add, if you
properly can, that petitiO~fj~Q .these two
cases do n~~n~ert ~fiazardous
conditions
d result from the Court's
opinion toJ ay unless the states, at public
expense, immediately assume~ responsibility.
JI Then, Cabell, in fairness 1 think we should say

~: /

'

'

3.

that New York - because of the reckless
abandonment of the Long Island facility already has had to spend some $2 million(?), for
which there may or not be reimbursement.

In other words, Cabell, I think at the very
beginning of our dissent we should expand what you have
said and also be careful to present the "horror story"

~ ~~

accurately in every respect.
-r·-AJ Jf ~.yrtA- ¢.. ~-~ ~
't-1
(}
L.F.P., Jr.
~ ~ ~9~
~
ss

. '

To: The Chief Justice ~
Justice Brennan ~
Justice White
·
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS.

84-801

AND

84-805

MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER
84-801
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION:, DEBTOR,
PETITIONER
84-805
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

~

December-, 1985]

C__/ . JUSTICE POWELL,

issenting.
These two petitions or certiorari, arising out of the same
bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether
trustee in bankruptcy may abandon property that is burdene or of inconsequential value to the estate without regard
to any general requirement of compliance to state regulatory
laws. In the Jight of the restrict" pre-1978 abandonment
power of the bankruptcy trustee, the limited scope of other
bankruptcy provisions, and congressional interest in protecting the environment from toxic wastes, we conclude that the
trustee's authority under 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 is not an unlimited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate
1
Section"554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."

__.:;)

/
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but instead is subject to compliance with certain state and
local regulatory laws.
I
On October 6, 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following
month, the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding
-£-r
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioiJfin No.
84-805, was thereupon appointed trutee in bankruptcy.
At its facility in Long Island City, New York, Quanta had
an ownership interest in the real property (subject to two
mortgages totalling$ 454,464), th~ facility, and its inventory.
Mortgages exceeded the value of the property, and the estimated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil plainly
rendered the property a net burden to the estate. · After trying without success to sell the site for the benefit of Quanta's
.creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pursuant
to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. No ·one disputed that
trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of
"inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of
§554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public
health and safety, and that the act of abandonment itself
would violate state and federal environmental law. New
York rested its objection on both "public policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and the requirement
of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), requiring a trustee to "manage and
operate" the property of the estate "according to the valid
laws of the State in which the property is situated." New
York asked the bankruptcy court to order that the assets ofthe estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with
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I

..{

applicable law 2 After briefng and argument, the Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he
City and State are in a better position in every respect than
either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be
done to protect the public against the dangers posed by the
PSB-contaminated facility." The District Court affirmed
and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
· Upon abandonment, the trustree remov.ed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-supression system.
New York clea~ up the facility, with the exception of con~
11
taminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 million. , . - - - - c._:_.)
At the Edgewater, New Jersey, site, Quanta leased the
underlying real prooperty and owned outright the facility and
its inventory. Quanta procesed waste oil at Edgewater pursuant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP),
respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEJ;> discovered that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit in having more than 400,000 gallons of PCBcontaminated oil at the Edgewater site, and ordered Quanta
to sease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta
began negotiations concerning cleanup of the property, but
on October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy be___.
fore the negotiations had concluded. The next day, NJDEP

~

5kt~
the priority of

Th~ue in this litigation may b~
creditors' claims. New York seu~l:i
_ __,..,;..il.y"' an admini,trntivo
lf Ne..w York's claim t:
·
.
before us.
2

oxpen~; ~
· a

·

,

·s n t

u.~
~

u::;.. q.p- t#.t...;t:;.. .. ~

4'

-------.. $

kf

\,

\

\

84-801 & 84-805--DISSENT
4

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J . DEPT. OF E . P.

issued an admnistrative order requiring Quanta to clean up
the site.
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intent to abandon personal property at the
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on
May 20, 1983, over NEJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste.
Because the New Jersey case and the New York case presented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court decisions to permit abandonment. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 (1984)
(Quanta I); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927
(Quanta II). Although the court found little guidance in
§ 554's legislative history, the ~ity concluded that Con- ,;/
gress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment
practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act.
Under that law, where iBijlart:mt, state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest, that interest
k_t:;;_.
should not be overridden by the j.ndgemuie abandonment :5 -_-~
power. The court also found evidence in other provisions of ~
the bankruptcy code that Congress did not intend to preempt } all state regulation, only that ground on policies outweighed
by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, the/ Court of /
Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in permitting
abandonment, and remanded both cases for further
proceedings. 3

--6

•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 clearly permits abandonment without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic
stay. The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of
§ 554 raise substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-

,

.
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly limited the
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property, 469
U.S.--, and affirm.
II
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by a limited number of relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could not abandon several barges when the abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation
of federal law. The Court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit 9o., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an
unexpired lease), it conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with state law.· Similarly, in In re Lewis
Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to
address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims
for reimbursement.

~
~
rkA.I~1-J
/k._

l/-0"

k-t_

tr(L/
r~~
~

~
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bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
·
language fitting for so drastic a change").
II

Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Terms ago when the State of Ohio sought compensation for
cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is Kovas or another in the event the
receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the
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property, or a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee-must comly with the environmental laws
of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may
not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State,
or refuse to remove the source of such conditions."
Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985)
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 4 has been described as "one of the fundamental
• Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the
Government to commence or continue legal proceedings.
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the Government to
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate.
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception was to protect public health and
safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, p. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 5 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly. Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 6
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. In§ 959(b),
the Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in his. possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the
trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and
See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
6
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
5

84-801 & 84-805-DISSENT
10

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

not when he is liquidating it. The Court declines to reach
that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a petition to abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion].'" With all respect, such a formulation begs the question.
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979),
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 7 This reading is also consistent
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiverships within the
reach of state law. 8 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted
by applying state laws." Ibid.

III
Although the reasons elaborated upon above are sufficient
for concluding that Congress did not intend for the abandonment power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find
additional support for restricting that power in repeated con7
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.' S.
,(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
8
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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gressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers
Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U. S. - - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their
creation until after their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative
restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment." 42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep.
No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). Congress broadened the scope of
the statute and tightened the regulatory restraints in 1984. 9
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended by Pub. L. 98-80,
§ 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of
some sites and require certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid for the cleanup.
The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure
such relief as may be necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of
Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper
storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am
9

Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
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unwilling to presume that by its enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the
common-law abandonment power.
IV
~~
In the light of the restricted yr~78 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intencYfor § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. A..Jfustee may not abandon property in
contravention of ~.~tute or regulation that is reasonably
~ ,-~calealat~ to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.
e trustee may not a an on hazardo materials and to aggravate already-existing dange
y halting
security measures that prevent public ent , andalism, and
fire. 10 Under the Court's ruling, it i ot at all clear that the
trustees are not required to ta
ven relatively minor steps
to reduce imminent dan , such as security fencing, drainage and diking re · s, sealing deteriorating tanks, and re- r--..._moval of exp ve agents not on a school stove. Because I
believe tb Congress did not grant trustees an apparently
unliJnited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate,
..L
I dissent.
~ f\.Qri..T p~

Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today construes 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to permit a trustee in bankruptcy to
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential
value to the estate without regard to "any general requirement of compliance with state regulatory laws." Ante, at
- - . The Court recognizes only a narrow restriction on this
abandonment power, such as "where abandonment by the
trustee might itself create a genuine emergency that the
trustee would be uniquely able to guard against." Ante, at
- - . I believe, however, that the meaning of§ 554 must be
determined in the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonSection 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."
1
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ment power of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of
the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions.
Upon such review, it is clear that Congress did not intend the
interpretation of§ 554(a) adopted by the Court today.
I

The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by a limited number of relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could not abandon several barges when the abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation
of federal law. The Court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an
unexpired lease), it conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis
Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the
bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them.
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Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts , 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").
II

Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a
trustee in bankruptcy power equal to the abandonment
power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I show
below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative
determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to
ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code
has conferred special powers upon the trustee and where
there was no common law limitation on that power, Congress
has expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
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tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv'Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
·
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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ing the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the
Government to commence or continue legal proceedings.
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the Government to
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate.
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception was to protect public health and
safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly
broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, p. 5-6 (1981), an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at 4-5.
Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce
their antipollution laws, 3 and Congress wanted to overrule
' See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly , 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
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these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. Rep.
95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to limit
this new power expresslyG.\)Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for the
Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. In§ 959(b), the
Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate
the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners have
contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is
actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when
he is liquidating it. The Court declines to reach that precise
issue, and instead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a
petition to abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion]."' With all respect, such a formulation begs the
question.
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are
obliged to give effect, if possible, ·to every word Congress
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979),
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
• Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
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Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. - - , - - (1985) (stating,
after surveying the trustee's various powers, that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor"). This reading is also consistent
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiverships within the
reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886);
H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). The
precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements for
the operation of the business, even if the continued operation
of the business would be thwarted by applying state laws."
In re Quanta Resources Group, 739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3
1984).
III
Finally, I cannot find a legislative intent to confer unrestricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bankruptcy
when Congress has repeatedly emphasized its "goal of protecting the environment against toxic pollution." Chemical
Manufacturers Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 470 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Congress has
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after their permanent
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
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the regulatory restraints in 1984. 5 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and require certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the
parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers
the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 42
U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern
over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling to presume that by
its enactment of § 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.
IV
Today's holding allows the trustees of these bankrupt estates to abandon hazardous materials and to aggravate already-existing dangers by halting security measures that
prevent public entry, vandalism, and fire. 6 Under the
• Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
•Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
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Court's ruling, it is not at all clear that the trustees are not
required to take even relatively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking
repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive
agents not on a school stove. 7 Because I believe that Congress did not grant trustees an apparently unlimited license
to abandon property of the bankrupt estate, I dissent.

sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id. , at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
7
Both abandonment orders, now affirmed by the Court, were without
qualification. The EPA urged the pre-abandonment steps outlined in the
text as part of its Region II Action Memorandum (Jan. 25, 1985) (lodged
with the Court).
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JUSTICE POWELl(, ctissenbng.X\
0
These ~petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same
bankruptcy proceeding, resent the question whether
rustee in an
ptcy may abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate without regar
to any general requirement of compliance to state regulator
laws. In the light of the restrict pre-1978 abandonmen
power of the bankruptcy trustee, the limited scope of othe
bankruptcy provisions, and congressional interest in protect
ing the environment from toxic wastes, we conclude that the
trustee's authority under 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 is· not an un
limit
rt
\ 1\\"\e. \8 O.CS.t.§F==:;--

' - - - - - - - J 1 ~ 554(a) reads:

"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."

""e. ~. J

84-801 & 84-805---DISSENT
2

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

I

,JOn October 6, 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following
month, the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding r- \'.\A ·
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petition in No.
FJ....
84-805, was thereupon appointed trutee in bankruptcy.
At its facility in Long Island City, New York, Quanta had
an ownership interest in the real property (subject to two
mortgages totalling$ 454,464), the facility, and its inventory.
Mortgages exceeded the value of the property, and the estimated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil plainly
rendered the property a net burden to the estate. After trying without success to sell the site for the benefit of Quanta's
creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pursuant
to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. No one disputed that
trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of
"inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of
§554J
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public
health and safety, and (!;hat the act of abandonment ltseiOJL.would violate state and federal e vironmental law. N w
York rested its objection on o "public policy" considerations reflected in a li ble local laws, and~the requirement
"manage and
of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), e mrin a trustee
operate" the property of the estate "according to . the valid
laws of the St~in which the property is situated." New
York asked th Q nkruptcy !.! urt to order that the assets of
facility into compliance with
the estate be u - to

bring~e
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~--~----~~-~~--lil
applicable la 2 After brieflg
and argument, the Bankt..::J
ruptcy Court a proved the abandonment, noting that "(t]he
City and State re in a better position in every respect than
either the trust e or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be
C
done to protec the public against the dangers posed by the
~-contamin ed facility." The District Court affirmed
and New York ppealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
0
Upon abandonment, the trus~e removed t e 24-hour
ard service and shut down the fire-su ess1 n sys em.
New York cleaned up the facility, with the excep ion of c,ontaminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 million.
t t e Edgewater, New Jersey, site, uanta ease t e
underlying real prooperty and owned outright the facility and
its inventory. Quanta procesed waste oil at Edgewater pur
suant to a temporary operating permit issued by the Ne
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP),
respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discovered that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit in having more· than 400,000 gallons of PCBcontaminated oil at the Edgewater site, and ordered Quanta
to sease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta
began negotiations concerning cleanup of the property, but
on October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy before the negotiations had concluded. The next day, NJDEP
e Issue m t IS litigation may be sru to re uce t e to t e priOrity of
reditors' claims. New York sought to have the cost of clean up receive
riority as an administrative expense. The question of the priority o
ew York's claim for expenditures to render the site safer, however, is not
efore us. Nor do we pass on the question of whether the bankruptcy
court could have or should have ordered that the assets of the estate be
used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. We hold
only that a trustee in bankruptcy may not abandon property in contravention of certain local laws designed to protect the public health or safety.
Such a restriction, in some cases, may mean that the trustee merely retains
title to the property until the liquidation is completed, when the propertY)
would revert to the mortgage holders or the debtor's r
hell.
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issued an admnistrative order requiring Quanta to clean up
the site.
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his inten(' to abandon personal property at the
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy
rt a rov
nm
0
May 20, ~ over N DEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste.,(
Because the New Jersey case and the New York case preTE1\T' 0~ FTNT
sented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigaI~ IN ~\LE
S
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B).
''G.U~NT2.''
A divided P.anel of the ou
A eal
·
the lower court deci · n to ermit abandon-1---;
n re uanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 (1984)
'-~; In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927
:~~ Although the court found little guidance in
~ legislative histoi;[; the majority)concluded that Con- \ ~ §55~) ·r\- )
gress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment
practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act.
P
Under that law, whereGmportanDstate law or general eqmtahie
principles
protec(
some)
public
interest
that
mterest)\-~;\'ho~
~Mbs~ \
\ed.. ~~r
~hould not be) overridden by the judge-made a'bandonment t
\ wc:-u. .IV'OT
pow~
er. The court also found evidence in other provisions of
the Q nkruptcy~ode that Congress 1 no m en o preemp
~ )~
all s ate regulati"dn,1only that groun on olicies outwei hed
by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, th~ Court of
~
Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in p<erm
- I....tt~Ing
--~ooc--abandonment, and remanded both cases for further
proceedings. 3

JJ

3

8

Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554
permits abandonment without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic
stay The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of
§ 554 rais~substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-

0
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. . --,and affirm.

0

II
r\ ®~e.~}
;-.. lfhe trustee's abandonment ower Qiefare\ the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Cod had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine inten ed to protect legitimate state \\-he. ~ ~
or federal interests. This was made clear by it limited) ~ -..:. _;_;;.--...J
ae:r ef relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could not abandon several barges when the abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation
~
of federal law. The ,.Court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d. , at 290.

b

In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trust~e of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation.
i the court did not forbid the
trusteE@ abando ent o property (i. e., 1s re ec 1
an
unexpired lease), it conditioned \the trusteej)actions to ensure compliance with state law. Similarly1illln re Leuns
Jones, Inc ., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to
address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims
for reimbursement.

~

~
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bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex·pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").
II

Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed_ to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Te~ when the State of Ohio sought compensation for
cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not que~s~ti~o~n~tJ]h~an;~le..lll..;P!liiaeS&Qll..Ql._-\ [ th d b~1
the site-whether it is ovas or another in the event the
e.. e.
receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the
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property, or a vendee fro_m the receiver or the bq,nkruptcy trustee-must co~y with the environmental laws
of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may
not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State,
or refuse to remove the source of such conditions."
Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. - , - (1985){..
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deterthat the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitwionJ
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to ban~ a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 4 has been described as "one of the fundamental
min~tion

• Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act 'of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;

\ , .

, )
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estatE( of the debtol} Congress has enacted
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the
Government to commence or continue le al roceedin s.
For example, Section 62(b)(5) permits the Government to
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate.
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the urposes of this exception as to protect pu 1c health and
safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: h~d Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;

and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."

\

\
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enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, ~5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years ear1ier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at
4- 5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose Stat~ efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 5 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessa for Con ess to
limit this new power expressly. Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 6
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for \
;\,
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. W959(b~ l ~e.:-:0:
the Cede commands debtor in possession to "manage and op-'----'1::>-..:
erate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the
trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and
See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report referred lso to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the tate of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
6
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
5

l
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not when he is li uidatin it. The Court declines to reach
that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trust- L--ee's filing of a petition to abandon does not constitute 'man' --...1.....•...................L-J.J=~o~~;u.u........._,~,.....J
age[ment]' or 'operat[ion].' ',mulation be s the uestion.
§ 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 0
usmess
because that interpretation gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp ., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979),
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase " 'manage[ment]' of the 'property,"' could
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F . 2d, at 919. 7 This reading is @ consistent
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiverships within the
reach of state law. 8 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted
by applying state laws." Ibid.

III
____y
--\ ~~ j
Although the reasons elaborated W!» above @'e sufficient) \
f'or poncludmg) that Congress did not intend for the abandonment power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find
additional support for restricting that power in repeated con7See Commodity Futures Tradini' Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
-, (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
8
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).

~
~
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gressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers
Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U. S. - - , - - (1985). Congress has ena~ted ·a Resource .R
Conservation and Recovery Act( (RCRAl, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their
creation until after their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative
restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment." 42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep.
No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). Congress broadened the scope of
the statute and tightened the regulatory restraints in 1984. 9
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended by Pub. L. 98-80,
§ 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a n
ance cleanu of
some sites and requir certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid for the cleanup.
The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure
such relief as may be necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of
Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the imp~ , . . . _ ,
storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, ~
9

Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§.6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
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unwilling to presume that by ~enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the
common-law abandonment power.
IV
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This exception to the
abandonment
power
vested in the trustee
by §554 is a narrow
one.
It
does
not
encompass a speculative or indeterminate
future violation of
such laws that may
stem
from
abandonment.
The abandonment power is not to
be fettered by laws
or
regulations
not
reasonably calculated
to protect the public
health or safety from
imminent and identifiable harm.

before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
.ef Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
!edings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case
0,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
·ioraring containers where they "present risks of explanation of water supplies, destruction of natural re·, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
1tes as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
3 at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap;allons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
.ppendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
lith effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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unwilling to presume that by :iia. enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the
common-law abandonment power.
IV
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. l/(. trust
not abandon ro ert in
contravention of a statute or regulation that is reasonably
ca cu a e to protect the public health or safety from identis The trustee may not a an on azar ous mar;;.te~r~Ia~s~a~n~t~o.Jaggravate already-existing dangers by halting
'---,., security measures that prevent public entry, vandalism, and
e. 10 Under the Court's ruling, it is not at all clear that the
rustees are not required to take even relatively minor steps
o reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainge and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and reoval of explosive agents not on a school stove. Because I
elieve that Congress did not grant trustees an apparently
nlimited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate,
dissent .

• \Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 84-801

AND

84-805

MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER
M-~1

u

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION, DEBTOR,
PETITIONER
84-805
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[December - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was once in
the
business of processing waste oil at two facilities, one in Long
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New
1
Title 18 U. S. C. § 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."

?
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Jersey. Quanta processed waste oil aJ Edgewater pursuant
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in No. 84-801. In June 198 , NJDEP discovered
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit by accepting more than 400,poo gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic cardinogen. NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, NJDEP
and Quanta began negotiations concernipg the cleanup of the
Edgewater site, .f n*on October 6, 1981, pefore the conclusion
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petitio~ndlan'Por.uptey. The
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and the following mont , the action was converted to li~idation proceeding under Chapter
~·
Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy.
Investigatiory( the Long Island City facility revealed that
~
Quanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the mortg'"age"~xceeded the value of the
property~ estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rend~red the property a net burden to the estat~.
After trying without success to sell ong Island City property for the benefit of Quanta's ere 1tors, the trustee notified
the creditors and the Bankrupt Court that he intended to
abandon the property pursuan lto §554(a). No party to the
bankruptcy proceeding disp ed the trustee's allegation that
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to
the estate" within the m aning of § 554.
The City and the S te of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that aban~nment would threaten the public
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envirk rested its objection on "public
ronmental law. New

J1J..
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to b'ring the facility into compliance with appl~ble law. After briefing and argument,
t e
~~?urt approved the abandonment, noting
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District
Courtl.).affirmed >and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to clean up the facility, with
the exception of contaminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5
million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by
the hazardous waste. 3
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents.
2

7
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Because the New Jersey case and the New York ca
resented identical issues, the parties§ the New Jersey litigatimj consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 405(c)(1)(B).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in~egislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress ~ o
pre-empt all state regulation, but only that groun~ed onpolicies outweighed by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases
for further proceedings. 4

7

Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry,
vandalism, and fire.
Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The trustees in this case
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explosion, fire , contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id. , at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U.S. - , and affirm.
II

Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the Nationa! Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a),S has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
5
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly. ~Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b)1
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the
See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
7
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated , in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
8
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and
not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'"
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by
applying state laws." Ibid.
IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
8
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
-, (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
9
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong. , 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1886).
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- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C. §§6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

°Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
1
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v
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
11

§ 554 is a narrow one.
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JUSTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was once in
the
business of processing waste oil at two facilities, one in Long
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New
'Title 18 U. S. C. § 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."
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Jersey. Quanta processed waste oil at Edgewater pursuant
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discovered
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP
and Quanta began negotiations concerning the cleanup of the
Edgewater site, but on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy. The
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and the following month, the action was converted to liguidation proceeding under Chapter
7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy.
Investigations the Long Island City facility revealed that
Quanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the mortgages exceeded the value of the
property, and estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
Mter trying without success to sell Long Island City property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to
abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the
bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's allegation that
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to
the estate" within the meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment, noting
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District
Court affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to clean up the facility, with
the exception of contaminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5
million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by
the hazardous waste. 3
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
a The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents.
2
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Because the New Jersey case and the New York case presented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(1)(B).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress intended to
pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases
for further proceedings. 4
Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry,
vandalism, and fire.
Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The trustees in this case
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id. , at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
' Judge Gibbons dissented , arguing that §554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to deterinine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§554, 469 U.S.-, and affirm.
II
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.

In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--, - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title , or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
5
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of §§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly. ~Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 7
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the
See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
7
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
6
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and
not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'"
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by
applying state laws." Ibid.
IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc . v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
,(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
9
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
8
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- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

°Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
1
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v
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

11

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
§ 554 is a narrow one.
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PETITIONER
v.
84-805
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[December - , 1985]

JusTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) ' of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

0

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) @as onde m · =-nfe)
OO.siaess ef f!Peeessiag waste oil at two facilities, one in Long
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New

--·~---+~

' Title 1~ IT S c §it54(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate. "

J
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) Quanta q>rocess:<tWastil oil a; Eagev;ate~rsuant
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jerse-y- - - , - Department of Environmental Protection NJDEP) respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discovered
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewate~
\..-----4IDJ
5in;:;";:dT7'iQh.u~
an
;:;;t~iilbegan negotiations concerning the cleanup of the
Ed ewater sit
ut on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petitionC m bankriipt~. The
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition remame peri ous, owever, an
e o owmg mon , .t:Re ae .Q..
~ v.ras 49t:WOtte4 to \1I!uidation proceeding under hapter
7. Thomas J. O'Neil1, petitioner m No. 84-805, Was ap~ pointed trustee in bankruptc .
A~~~GIA.~\.) .\~·
.lj
¥fivestigatwn he Long Island City facility revealed that
~\------.Q
~uanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deterioratin and leakin containers. Since the mortgages exceeded --~~~~:.);{
·o pPopel"ty, and estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
After trying without success to sell !Long Island City property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to
o party to the
abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a .
bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's allegation that
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to
the estate" within the meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
,
contending that abandonment would threaten the publi~
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public

------
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
~~~}
\'the Bawa''npt ey Cii!irt ( approved the abandonment, noting
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District
ourt affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 1 k
~
became necessary for New York to @an ® tFle facility, witFl \
\)'(\. w.rv.
J
the exception of contaminate subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5
u~~~~~~;2.J
million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the istrict Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee ave -\h....
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the ~
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by
the hazardous waste. 3

____
+

2
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents.

/
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cr\ ~

Because the New Jersey case and the New York caseipre...--) Nc.w
N....,
sented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litiga'lc:rJn.. ~o.C:.:l XA~
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(1)(.D+w----t~"'UVA divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
~
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidepce in other
"provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that CongressJintend 11"'l'o--"ipre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interest!' Accord- L§J
ingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases
for further proceedings. 4

L

Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry,
vandalism, and fire_0
<:J omt Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard
Docyk, .Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). <J:!ae tf'\i:eteee in tftie eaee
ave-aba.nJ;ianM 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinQg~ic waste oil
in unguarded, deterioraring containers wtr~ne~ "present risks of explosion, fire , contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra,
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.

-

()
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U.S. - , and affirm.
II
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.

In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S . - - , - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
5
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.[ ]l'itle 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 7
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the
' See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
7
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and
not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,"'
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F . 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by
applying state laws." Ibid.
IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
,(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
' See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
8
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- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.
Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).

10
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v
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered

"'----f

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
11

§ 554 is a narrow one.
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POWEL~vered

JUSTICE
the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed) waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the :8dgewater fa~

Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate. "
1
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. ~-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank,
petit'oner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000
)
loan"'secured by Quanta's inventoryj accounts receivable, and
certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two
began negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater
site. But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up
the site. Quanta's financial condition remained perilous,
however, and the following month, it converted the action to
a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J.
O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in
bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both
facilities.
Mter Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
Mter trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, t';:!.h~e'-""'......,...._,.,'--1 .}\ r -fh. 1)1s~ -n'-+ cJ'
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he inNw J~'f<.e.
tended to abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a). No
party to the bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's
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allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City
and State are in a better position in every respect than either
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCBcontaminated facility." The District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2.5 million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami2
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to H U. S. G. § 405(c)(1)(B)
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department);
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4,
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id.,
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both
cases for further proceedings. 4
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether th
ourt of
als ro erl construed
0
§ 554, 469 U~· ---,ce
::"~
~-=s::
ffi=r.::.
m..:.._-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
II
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. - - , - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield t~overn
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, a . One
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec5
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).

j

Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C.J 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence that
Congress did not i:b'tend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt
6
See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
' Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-

r~

~
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all state laws. Section 959(b) commandsl\,debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession
. . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the
State." The petitioners have contended that§ 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business
of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'"
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
of state law. 9 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of
the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by
applying state laws." Ibid.
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
8
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
,(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
9
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 4~th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
10

Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
11

§ 554 is a narrow one.
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa' Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site.
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations,
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities.
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to§ 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the
meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City
and State are in a better position in every respect than either
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCBcontaminated facility." The District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2.5 million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami2

The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department);
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4,
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id.,
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both
cases for further proceedings. 4
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U. S. - - . We now affirm.
II

Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
4
Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change").

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--, - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a),S has been described as "one of the fundamental
5

Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301 , 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
8. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre6
See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's anti-pollution Jaws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
7
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee , receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in
possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of
the State." The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'"
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of
the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by
applying state laws." Ibid.
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
8
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S.
-, (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
9
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1886).
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IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
10
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
11

§ 554 is a narrow one.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 84-801 AND 84-805

MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER
~-Bill

u

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION, DEBTOR,
PETITIONER
~-805
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January -

. , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari~ arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.

I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa1

Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating pennit issued by the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating
pennit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site.
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations,
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner
in No. 84-805, was·appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities.
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-

,.I
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the
meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. §959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City
and State are in a better position in every respect than either
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCBcontaminated facility." The District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2.5 million. 2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami1
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to §405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in1

The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department);
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4,
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id.,
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).

..
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both
cases for further proceedings. •
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U. S. - . We now affirm.
II
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimerv. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." Id., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 pennits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con- .
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, ''the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\
Although these cases
do not define for us
the exact contours of
the trustee IS abandonnent power, they do make
clear that this power
was subject 'to certain
restrictions when Con-

gress enacted~ 554(a).

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Tenn when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
finn may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 6 has been described as "one of the fundamental
'Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-

I :.
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary'' judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 8 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b)1 provides additional evidence
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre'See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also refened to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
1
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in
possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of
the State." The petitioners have contended that §959(b) is
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate."
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
reason why the phrase "'rnanage[ment]' of the 'property,"'
coqld not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
Secticn 959 (b) does not, of state law.• The pFeeept ef § 959(9) is eleaF; "[T]he geals ef
of course, delimit the
the feaef'fH .ei:mle"Qpiey laws, inelaaiRg Feh&9iliiatieR ef the
precise conditions on an aeeieP, ae Rei aathePise tP&Rs~essieR ef st&te laws setting
~~~= ~~ (a)pe~emeftts fep. the epeP&tieR. ef the 9asiRess, eveR if the
' Sectioo 959 (b)'s limita- . eefttlftt:led epe!'fttteft ef tl\e B1:iStftess weald ee th·N&Ptea ey
tioo, however, SUPJ:X>rts ·applying state laws" Tbid

1

.'

our finding that Congress---did not intend for the
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situBa.nlauptcy Code to pre....
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
enpt. all state laws.
'See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
-, (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that ''the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management
authority over the debtor").
'SeeS. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No.7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886) .

.
I
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IV

Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent di.sposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. §6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert ''imminent and substantial endangerment
•• Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (gX6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

·I

It is so ordered.

·.

We also 'WOUld have a
different case when a

bankruptcy court authorized abandannent conditioned upon the trustee's adequately protecting the public • s
health and safety.

u This

exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm./\
§ 554 is a narrow one.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These petitions for certiorari~ arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C.
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect
the public's health or safety.
I
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa'Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate. "
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site.
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations,
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities.
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the
meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City
and State are in a better position in every respect than either
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCBcontaminated facility." The District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2.5 million.2
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contamiThe sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
2
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 405(c)(l)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department);
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4,
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id.,
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both
cases for further proceedings. 4
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§554, 469 U.S.--. We now affirm.
II

Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generate Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\
Although these cases
do not define for us
the exact contours of
the trustee's abandonment power, they do make
clear that this power
was subject 'to certain
restrictions when Congress enacted~ 554(a).

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec5
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
•
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20. 03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id. , § 20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre6

See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly , 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
7
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the @torS!i
j)ossessioiil to "manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of
the State." The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it.
ap
rusrM i
e cone u e a
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretatio
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate.'
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every wor
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 442 U. S. 330, 339
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more
han "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no
eason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'"
ould not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of
roperty in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources t--"'"'-orp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with
he section's legislative history, which shows the provision
as designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach
f state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of
he federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting
requirements for the operation of the business, even if th
ontinued operation of the business would be thwarted b
lxi_ng_state laws." lbid. r---------~
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
ommo tty utures ra mg Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. .
,(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers,
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management ...........authority over the debtor").
9
See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc.
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of~ statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 198~n the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
c::;)ongress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

n the lig t o e restricted pre-1978 abandonment power
f the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited
cope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that
ongress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state nd local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon
roperty in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
s reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety
om identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgent
Circui
It is so ordered.

his exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
11

§ 54 is a narrow one.
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I

Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater facility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site.
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations,
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities.
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
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trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the
meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument,
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City
and State are in a better position in every respect than either
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCBcontaminated facility." The District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2.5 million. 2
2
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
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On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in legislative history of
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or
3

The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department);
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4,
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id.,
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both
cases for further proceedings. 4
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U. S. - - . We now affirm.
II

Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for
reimbursement.

84-801 & 84-805-0PINION
6

MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P.

upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D.
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam
lines before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change"). Although these
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cases do not define for us the exact contours of the trustee's *
abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was*
subject to certain restrictions when Congress enacted*
§ 554(a).
*
III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste ~ite of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. - - , - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing
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a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 u. s. 513, 534.
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
5
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the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981),
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R.
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly
6

See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175.
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increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to
limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the trustee to
"manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State."
The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. Even though
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under
§ 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code-and therefore does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment-the section
nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not
intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws
that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.
IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C. §§6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
7

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
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their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 8 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-1978 *
abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bank- *
ruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not *
8

Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).

*
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intend for § 554(a) to preempt all state and local laws. The *
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an *
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade- *
quately protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly, :
without reaching the question whether certain state laws im- *
posing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to *
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold *
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of *
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to *
protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. 9 *
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals *
for the Third Circuit.
*
It is so ordered.

9

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
§ 554 is a narrow one.
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These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether § 554(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 554(a),t authorizes a
trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention
of state laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to
protect the public's health or safety.
' Section 554(a) reads:
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value to the estate."
Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after "value" in
§ 554(a). Pub. L. 98-353, Tit. III, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 380.
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Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater facility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site.
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations,
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day,. NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities.
Mter Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate.
Mter trying without success to sell the Long Island City
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
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trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the
meaning of § 554.
The City and the State of New York (collectively New
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected,
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's
health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on "public
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according
to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is .situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that the assets of the estate be used to
bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After
briefing and argument, the court approved the abandonment,
noting that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in
. every respect than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to
do what needs to be done to protect the public against the
dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed, and New
York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of
about $2. 5 million. 2
2

The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question,
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is
not before us.
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On April23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed
by the hazardous waste. 3
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Although the court found little guidance in the legislative history of § 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment practice developed under
the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state
3
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix in No. 83-5142 (CA3), pp. 11-12 (affidavit
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for N. Y. City Fire Department); id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before De Vito, J.). The
470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of
water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New
York site); Appendix in No. 83-5730 (CA3), p. A7 (400,000 gallons at New
Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra,
at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire);
id., at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 20 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives).
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law or general equitable principles protected certain public
interests, those interests were not overridden by the judgemade abandonment power. The court also found evidence in
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did
not intend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that
grounded on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the
Bankruptcy Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. 4
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed
§ 554, 469 U. S. - - . We now affirm.
II
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially
developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or
federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant
cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal
law. The court stated:
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay.
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554
raised substantial questions under the Takings Clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the States' claims for
reimbursement.
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upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the
public interest." I d., at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA7),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277
(Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its
equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines
before abandoning them.
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In
codifying the judicially developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979).
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts , 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939)
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find
language fitting for so drastic a change"). Although these
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cases do not define for us the exact contours of the trustee's
abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was
subject to certain restrictions when Congress enacted
§ 554(a).

III
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last
Terrll when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation:
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. - - , - - - - (1985) (emphasis added).
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore nonbankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there
was no common-law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9.
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held nearly two years ago in the
context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtorin-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act]
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simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534 (1984).
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserving the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example,
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "nonmonetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from
Section 362(a) provides:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor."
5
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the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety:
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595,
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
supra, at 52 (emphasis added).
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of §§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions
to the judicially created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W.
Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, pp. 5-6
(1981), an expansion that had begun only five years earlier
with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id.,
§ 20.02, at 4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had
stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress
wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision.
See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face ofthe
6
See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to
enforce State's antipollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was
polluting a river in violation of the State's environmental protection laws.
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 174-175.
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greatly increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to limit this new power expressly.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b)7 provides additional evidence
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the trustee to
"manage and operate the property in his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State."
The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. Even though
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under
§ 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code-and therefore does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment-the section
nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not
intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws
that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers.

IV
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; 470 U. S.
- - , - - (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after
Section 959(b) provides:
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11 , a tru-stee, receiver or
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States,
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof."
7

.•
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their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983).
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 8 In the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment
power.

v

In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-1978
abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not
8
Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d),
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)).

84-801 & 84-80&-0PINION
MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P .

12

intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws. The
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly,
without reaching the question whether certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to
protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. 9
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.

This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.
9

§ 554 is a narrow one.

